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Abstract 
 
There is considerable empirical evidence that after controlling for factors known to 
affect the level of audit fees, the large international firms earn an audit fee premium. In this 
paper, we estimate a Big Six premium of 10% to 23% for a large sample of UK clients. 
Recent studies contend that the development of brand name and industry specialisation 
reputations is costly and the Big Six firms can expect a return from this investment. We find 
evidence consistent with brand name returns across most sub-samples of clients. However, 
the audit fees charged by the Big Six firms are not significantly higher than the fees charged 
by their non Big Six counterparts for the smallest quartile of clients. An explanation for this 
finding is that the demand for a firm with a brand name ‘bottoms out’ below a critical size 
because of the extra cost. The audit fees charged by the Big Six firms are not significantly 
higher for the sub-sample where industry specialisation is defined by the size of the non audit 
fee. An explanation for this result is that there may be an inter-relationship between the 
pricing of audit and non audit services. Unlike the prior literature, we find scant evidence of 
returns to industry specialisation. We believe that returns to specialisation are insignificant 
because the UK Big Six firms are large enough to be considered specialists across all 
markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Many empirical studies contend that the Big Six accounting firms1 charge premium 
audit fees. Simon and Francis (1988) estimate a premium of 18% across several studies2. 
Moizer (1997) reviews the literature and finds evidence of a Big Six premium, ranging from 
16% to 37%, in nine of the twelve countries analysed. Since UK and Australian researchers 
possess a comparative data advantage over their US counterparts3, the first motivation for this 
study is to analyse the pricing of UK audits. We find that the audit fees charged by the large 
international accounting firms are 10% to 23% higher than those charged by smaller firms.  
Following the principal-agent and costly contracting lines of thought, various theorists 
attempt to explain the observed Big Six premium as a return to investments in reputations for 
quality audits. Simunic (1980), Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Francis and Wilson (1986) 
argue that the demand for quality audit services increases as agency costs rise because agents 
enter into voluntary bonding schemes and/or shareholders increase the monitoring of their 
agents. Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983) contend that the supply of quality audit 
services within a competitive market is consistent with the theory of product differentiation. 
Craswell et al (1995) extend this argument by stating that the Big Six premium may be 
consistent with returns to brand name and industry specialist reputations. However, theorists 
are unclear as to whether brand name or industry specialist firms should charge premium 
fees. A counter-argument is that such reputable firms might enjoy economies of scale and 
pass on these cost savings in the form of lower audit fees.   
                                                          
1 Following the mergers in the UK between Coopers and Lybrand and Deloitte, Haskins and Sells and between 
Ernst and Whinney and Arthur Young, there were six large international accounting firms over the majority of 
the sample period. We will use the term Big Six (and refer to the firms using their original name) throughout 
this paper to encompass the times when they consisted of eight separate entities and when the number reduced 
to six. A further merger between Coopers and Lybrand and Price Waterhouse received EC approval in 1998.  
2 The papers analysed were Baber et al (1987), Etteredge and Greenburg (1990), Francis (1984), Francis and 
Simon (1987), Francis and Stokes (1986), Palmrose (1986a) and Rubin (1988). 
3 The disclosure of audit fees by listed UK clients has been required for many years by Company Law. Since 
1992, large clients are legally required to disclose their non audit fees by the Statutory Instrument SI 1991/2128. 
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Recent empirical studies test for evidence of returns to the investment and 
maintenance of brand name and industry specialisation reputations. Most of these studies 
report a significant brand name premium but the industry specialisation results have been 
mixed. Palmrose (1986a) tests for these returns simultaneously using a sample of 361 US 
clients. She estimates a brand name premium of 23% but finds that the industry specialisation 
premium is insignificant. Craswell et al (1995) separate the industry specialists from the non 
specialist firms. For a sample of 1,484 Australian clients, they report a brand name premium 
of 22% to 39% and an industry specialisation premium of 34%. DeFond et al (1996) also run 
independent regression analyses for a sample of 348 Hong Kong clients. They document a 
brand name premium of 63% and an industry specialisation premium of 29%. Finally, 
Matthews et al (1998) estimate a non Big Six industry specialisation premium of 26% for a 
sample of 160 Australian clients.  
A number of criticisms can be levelled at this literature. First, there is a lack of 
consensus as to the definition of a specialist and the importance of industry size is largely 
ignored. Second, the relationship between audit and non audit service fees have largely been 
ignored. A criticism of the US studies is that the sample sizes are often very small because 
researchers can only rely on contract clients completing a questionnaire as a data source. 
Finally, the descriptive statistics reported by various papers are unusual and cast doubts as to 
the validity of the results. 
The second motivation for this study is to estimate the size of returns to reputations 
for brand name and industry specialisation. We extend the prior literature by accounting for 
the size of the industry and using industry based and accounting firm share based definitions 
of specialisation. This paper develops a model that simultaneously tests for returns to brand 
name, non Big Six industry specialisation and Big Six industry specialisation reputations. 
Consistent with the prior work, we report strong evidence of brand name returns, however we 
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find that returns to industry specialisation reputations are insignificant. These null results may 
be driven by the conflicting pricing policies mentioned above and there is suggestive 
evidence that the large international accounting firms may have sufficient market power in 
the UK to be considered specialists across all industries. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Since the analysis of reputations 
for quality audits has been brief, we discuss the theoretical background and prior literature in 
section 2. We explain the research design in section 3, and present our results and summary 
in sections 4 and 5 respectively. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
This work addresses three interesting aspects of the audit services market – the quality 
of the product and the supply and demand for the service. Although there is a mandatory 
imposed demand for a generic level audit, the quality of the product is difficult to observe. 
Moizer (1997) contends that high quality audits may minimise the chance that the financial 
statements contain noise or bias but the risk of bias and error still prevails. Audit quality is 
difficult to observe because users do not have access to planning or working papers or 
substantial knowledge of the client’s internal control systems. The main verification of audit 
quality is provided in the case of audit failure but litigation cases against accounting firms are 
rare, especially after the verdict of the Caparo case, and many cases are settled out of court 
(Palmrose 1988). 
Economic theorists note that reputation effects develop in markets where product 
quality can only be resolved imperfectly after consumption. Rogerson (1983) contends that 
high quality firms gain a large market share by ‘word of mouth’ advertising and there is no 
incentive to reduce product quality if consumers quickly become aware of the shortfall. 
Shapiro (1983) reports that consumers use the quality of product purchased in the past as an 
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indicator of present or future quality. A firm may be willing to produce high quality items 
because they will reap the benefits from establishing a positive reputation. Therefore, 
economic theory predicts that firms may have the incentive to create and maintain reputations 
for quality.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Watts and Zimmerman (1986) and Simunic and Stein 
(1987) explain the demand for quality differentiated audit services using the agency and 
costly contracting frameworks. The need for the principal to motivate an agent arises because 
of the moral hazard problem and the assumption that the agent acts in a self interested way. In 
reality, corporations maintain order by way of signed contracts which specify the activities to 
be completed by the agent and the rewards received from these actions. The demand for 
quality audits is motivated in this framework as the reputable accounting firm monitoring the 
contracts between the principal and agent. 
The supply of quality differentiated audits can be motivated by the theory of product 
differentiation. Klein & Leffler (1981) argue that reputable accounting firms have an 
incentive to produce high quality audits (and incur the extra costs) because consumers will 
recognise this extra quality and reward the firms. Dupoch and Simunic (1980) contend that 
the inaccessibility of audit working papers forces users to judge audit quality on the basis of 
observable characteristics, including the firm’s name. Examples of the significant 
investments in the reputation of their services made by the Big Six accounting firms during 
the 1990’s include CLASS (Coopers and Lybrand Audit Support System) and Audit 
Innovation (Ernst & Young). Furthermore, Price Waterhouse benefited from their prestigious 
client portfolio in the 1980’s.  
Craswell et al (1995) expand the costly contracting and agency lines of thought and 
contend that accounting firms provide assurance about the integrity of the client’s control 
systems and financial statements. To the extent that these control systems are industry 
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specific, the client’s agency problems will take particular characteristics. Auditor 
specialisation in these industries may lead to higher levels of audit expertise and this 
expertise may be expected to comprise a significant element beyond the general expertise 
necessary for all audits. If an industry specialised audit requires additional expertise to 
provide readers with the same level of assurance as a non specialised audit, then accounting 
firms must undertake additional costly audit work and can expect positive returns to these 
investments (consistent with product differentiation). Craswell et al contend that if industry 
specialist audit fees are systematically higher than non specialist audit fees, this is consistent 
with the demand for quality differentiated audits in a competitive market because clients have 
voluntarily contracted with the costly specialists4.  
Economic theory is not fully supportive of the Craswell et al (1995) argument. There 
may be scale economies associated with industry specialisation and it is not clear whether 
these cost savings should be passed on to clients in the form of lower audit fees. Therefore it 
is important to consider what is meant by the term industry specialist. We believe that a 
specialist is an individual or group of people that have become experts within an industry. 
This expertise may arise through significant investments in the study of legal regulation, 
production processes and the market behaviour of major players. Industry specialist expertise 
may exist in a number of forms, it may be centred entirely on one person, it may involve a 
group of people of differing ranks working in an industry or it may be a set of audit seniors.  
In addition to considering the nature of specialisation, we believe that the size of the 
industry is also important. If an industry is small, few accounting firms may have the 
incentive to invest capital and labour resources in the creation and maintenance of reputations 
for industry specialisation because there is insufficient money, clients and returns on this 
                                                          
4 This does not imply that our Big Six accounting firms conduct poor quality work since all audits must satisfy 
the minimum quality level outlined under the profession’s regulations and the laws governing negligence. This 
demand for quality differentiated audits merely implies that a number of firms voluntarily specialise in the 
provision of greater levels of audit quality. 
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investment. If an industry is large, all of the Big Six firms may claim to have industry 
specialist expertise. If one observes size differences across industries, one might weight 
particular industries based upon the size of the market that they are competing for. Since the 
economic importance of industries varies both within one country and across national 
borders, it is important to examine the size of the industry.   
Several researchers test for evidence of specialisation but there is a lack of consensus 
as to the definition of a specialist and the size of an industry is often ignored. Palmrose 
(1986a) defines a specialist as the market leader(s) based on sales revenue. Craswell and 
Taylor (1991) use the definition of firms with at least 10% of the total number of clients, 
audit fees, or total (audit plus non audit) fees in an industry. DeFond et al (1996) classify 
specialists as the top three firms in an industry based on the market value of audit fees. 
Culvenor and Godfrey (2000) use an accounting firm measure of specialisation - the 
difference between the firm’s share of work in an industry against their share of the market. 
Recent papers consider the size of the industry within their definition of 
specialisation. Craswell et al (1995) modify their earlier work by defining specialists as those 
firms in industries containing at least 30 clients, who conduct the audit work for at least 10% 
(by number or fee revenue) of the clients. Ritson et al (1997) also require the industry to 
contain at least 30 clients and denote firms as specialists if they command at least 20% of the 
total audit revenues. Matthews et al (1998) denote as specialists those firms, in industries 
containing at least 10 client, with at least 2 clients and 20% of the audit fees. In an industry 
containing 5 to 9 clients, they define specialists as firms with at least 3 clients and 20% of the 
audit fees or at least 2 clients and 60% of the audit fees. Krishnan and Yang (1998) test two 
definitions of specialisation. First, they adopt the Palmrose (1986a) definition and second 
they test a continuous sales revenue measure in industries containing at least ten clients. 
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Francis et al (1999) categorise markets into those of less than 10 clients, 11-19 and greater 
than 20 clients. They define an ‘industry market leader’ as the firm with the greatest share of 
the market. Most of the above studies define specialisation based on the firm conducting a 
significant amount of audit work relative to the total industry audits and we summarise these 
studies in Table 1. This study extends the prior work by taking into account the size of the 
industry and the firm’s industry expertise relative to their portfolio of expertise across all 
their clients. We test both dichotomous and continuous measures of specialisation and use 
definitions based on both the share of the industry and the accounting firm.  
Table 1 Prior Study Definitions of Specialisation 
Paper Sample 
Date 









clients in the 
industry 
Palmrose (1986) 1981 1-3 Market leader(s) based on 
sales revenue 





10% of the audit fees or the 
total remuneration  
N/A N/A N/A 23 30 
Craswell et al  
(1995) 
1987 10% of clients or 10% of the 
audit fees  
* * N/A 23 30 
DeFond et al 
(1996) 
1992 Top 3 share of audit fees  * * Lower  3 N/A 
Ritson et al 
(1997) 
1989-1993 20% of all total audit revenues 
in the industry 
N/A N/A N/A 23 30 
Krishnan and 
Yang (1998) 
1999, 1990 Market leader based on sales 
revenue. Continuous proxy.  
N/A N/A N/A 61 10 




2 clients and 20% of fees if 
large industry, or, 2(3) clients 
and 60% (20%) of fees if small. 
N/A N/A * 17 5 




Industry market leader N/A N/A N/A 27 1 
Culvenor & 
Godfrey (2000) 
1997 If proportion of the firm’s work 
in industry exceeds their share 
of the market. 
N/A N/A N/A 26 N/A 
B6 Ind. Spec. = Returns to Big Six industry specialist reputations; NB6 Ind. Spec. = Returns to Non Big Six 
industry specialist reputations; No. Inds. = Number of industries in the sample. 
   
The rate of growth in the provision of additional advisory services has been a rapid 
and one must consider whether the accounting firms are selling a joint product. Simunic 
(1984) argues that there should be scale economies associated with the joint provision of 
these services. However, Turpen (1990), Barkess and Simnett (1994), Butterworth and 
Houghton (1995), Craswell et al (1995), Ezzamel et al (1996) and Firth (1997) observe a 
positive association between audit and non audit service fees. One rationale for this 
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correlation is that clients are willing to pay an audit premium for the right to purchase 
advisory services or for some specialist expertise in the field of advisory services. We extend 
the prior work by testing for returns to the provision of non audit services.   
 
3 Research Design 
We test for evidence of brand name and industry specialist reputations using two 
methodologies. First, we improve the existing methodology by simultaneously testing for 
returns to brand name, (hypothesis H1), non Big Six industry specialisation, (hypothesis H2) 
and Big Six industry specialisation reputations, (hypothesis H3)5. Second, we replicate 
Craswell et al (1995) and test for brand name returns by restricting our test to non specialist 
industries, (hypothesis H4) and removing specialist auditors from the sample, (hypothesis 
H5). We test for industry specialisation returns by excluding the non Big Six non specialists, 
(hypothesis H6) and by comparing the difference between specialist Big Six audit fees and 
non Big Six audit fees in specialist industries against the brand name premium of H5, 
(hypothesis H7). These hypotheses are stated formally as follows:  
H1 Ceteris paribus, the Big Six auditors have larger audit fees than non Big Six auditors.  
H2 Ceteris paribus, non Big Six industry specialist auditors will have higher audit fees than 
non Big Six non specialist auditors. 
H3 Ceteris paribus, Big Six industry specialist auditors will have higher audit fees than Big 
Six non specialist auditors. 
H4 In industries not having specialist auditor, Big Six auditors will, ceteris paribus, have 
larger audit fees than non Big Six specialists.  
H5 In industries having specialist auditors, non specialist Big Six auditors will, ceteris 
paribus, have larger audit fees than non-specialist non Big Six auditors.  
                                                          
5 As a form of sensitivity analysis, we also test the Palmrose (1986a) methodology but the results are not 
significantly different. 
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H6 In the industries having specialists, the specialist auditors will, ceteris paribus, have larger 
audit fees than the non-specialist Big Six auditors.  
H7 In those industries with specialists, the specialist Big Six auditors will, ceteris paribus, 
have larger audit fees than non Big Six non-specialist auditors, by an amount exceeding the 
brand name premium in hypothesis H5. 
The audit pricing literature is robust across different samples and countries and 
explains the majority of the variation of audit fees using proxies for client size, litigation risk, 
audit complexity and the Big Six dummy. We collected data on total assets, debt, earnings 
before interest and tax, financial year end, quick ratio, current ratio, operating profit, share 
issues and industry codes from the Standard and Poor’s Global Vantage database6. Since 
Global Vantage incorrectly reports auditors’ remuneration7, we collected audit and non audit 
service fee data from the Datastream International and Extel Company Research databases. 
These databases do not contain subsidiary information and the Global Vantage auditor 
identity dummy is defined using a US perspective8. Therefore, we collected subsidiary and 
auditor identity data by hand from the International Centre for Research in Accounting’s 
microfiche collection and the International Stock Exchange yearbook. Consistent with 
DeFond et al (1996), we exclude the auditor opinion dummy because of the infrequency of 
qualification over the sample period. We exclude missing or repeat observations for the same 
client, financial clients and any outlier observations9. We take logarithmic and square root 
                                                          
6 At the time of data retrieval, this database covers most of the major global indices, e.g. FT350, AMSE, NYSG 
and most of the local market indices for the 54 listed countries. 
7 On cross examination with the hard copies of financial statements, we found a number of fundamental errors 
on the Global Vantage database, resulting in a downward bias on the non audit fee. 
8 Since several US accounting partnership sign under a different name to their UK counterparts, there is a 
number of missing observations on this database. 
9 Global Vantage records financial information by type of share, hence clients with multiple share issues are 
recorded several times. 65 investment trusts are incorrectly included in the industrial database and must be 
removed for two reasons. First due to the nature of their business, interpretation of their financial statements and 
ratios is problematic. Second, financial institutions operate in widely different regulatory environments than 
industrials which might result in different costs for their auditors. We remove 108 outliers with the greatest 
(above £4 million) or smallest (below £10,000) 1% of the audit fees. We have later relaxed this assumption and 
tested the results using Windsorised outliers and by excluding outliers on all the major variables and although 
the explanatory power of the model falls, this does not affect the main results. 
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transformations to reduce the influence of the largest clients and after the transformation all 
the variables reported in Table 2 are well behaved10. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for the sample of UK clients 
Variable Mean St Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Audit fee 335.351 528.412 10.67 56 120 344 3800 
Total assets 475.871 1345.313 0.355 35.329 98.055 325.288 22565 
Subsidiaries 16.290 17.872 0 5 11 21 196 
Total debt 110.328 383.652 0 3.42 14.442 59.6 8898.752 
Operating profit 52.128 184.259 -235.9 3.243 9.502 31.999 3531 
EBIT 56.975 195.452 -235.9 3.413 10.425 35.113 3670 
Revenue 529.212 1256.835 0 45.14 119.376 352.681 13893 
NAS 260.468 2892.809 0 12 40 116 4000 
Remuneration 503.239 3558.118 0 40 104 285 7000 
Capital 491.194 1689.531 0.107 29.794 88.346 281.198 27367.71 
LAF 4.971 1.272 2.267 4.025 4.787 5.841 8.243 
LTA 11.655 1.616 5.872 10.472 11.493 12.692 16.932 
Sub 3.562 1.897 0 2.236 3.316 4.583 14 
Current 1.569 0.720 0.015 1.158 1.437 1.832 7.708 
Quick 0.937 0.585 0.012 0.631 0.861 1.121 7.575 
DTA 0.098 0.125 0 0.014 0.070 0.149 3.612 
ROI 0.107 0.108 -1.345 0.077 0.116 0.156 0.692 
Foreign 0.236 0.267 0 0 0.158 0.412 1 
YE 0.682 0.466 0 0 1 1 1 
Loss 0.150 0.357 0 0 0 0 1 
LREV 4.908 1.625 -3.863 3.814 4.783 5.869 9.578 
CATA 0.587 0.208 0.017 0.47 0.619 0.733 0.997 
LNAS 3.713 1.752 0 2.485 3.688 4.753 8.294 
Brand 0.733 0.442 0 0 1 1 1 
Audit Fee = Fee relating to the audit (£’000);Total Assets = Total assets (£’M); Subsidiaries = Number of 
domestic subsidiaries; Total Debt = Total debt (£’M); Operating profit = Profit (£’M); EBIT = Earnings before 
interest and tax (£’M); Revenue = Total revenue (£’000); NAS= Non audit fee (£’000); Capital = Market capital 
(£’M); LAF = natural logarithm of the audit fee (£’000); LTA = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000); Sub = 
square root of the number of subsidiaries; Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities; Quick = ratio of 
current assets less stock to current liabilities; DTA= ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ROI = ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax to total assets; Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
YE = fiscal year end between December and March; Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 
years; LREV  = natural logarithm of total revenue (£’000); CATA  = ratio of current assets to total assets; 
LNAS = natural logarithm of non-audit service fee; Brand = dummy variable, Big 6 Auditor = 1; Remuneration 
= total auditors’ remuneration; Capital = market value of client in £’M at 31/12/1995.  
 
This study tests for evidence of industry specialisation using dichotomous and 
continuous measures of specialisation. We first define specialisation using the dominant 
auditor industry model, (hereinafter DAI), where the dummy takes the value of 1 if the 
number of clients in an industry and the firm’s share of the industry audit fees both exceed 
                                                          
10 The extent of the skewness of our distribution can be assessed by comparing the mean and median values of 
the audit fee (£335,351 and £120,000 respectively) against the mean and median logarithm of audit fees which 
are 4.971 and 4.787 respectively. The mean and median Current and Quick ratios are similar to the figures one 
would a priori expect unlike the mean acid test ratio found by Craswell et al (5.828) and the mean Current and 
Quick ratios quoted by DeFond et al (0.447 and 2.157). We believe that these results may be affected by 
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10% and the industry contains at least 30 clients.11 Second, we define specialisation based on 
the accounting firm’s share of the industry, (hereinafter AFSI), where the dummy takes a 
value of 1 if at least 20% of the number of their clients and 20% of the value of their audit fee 
revenue is from the industry.12 The Big Six pricing regression and industry specialisation 
regressions are stated below: 
LAF =    +   LTA +   Sub +   Current +   Quick +   DTA +   ROI
+   YE +   Foreign +   Loss +   Auditor +                                              (1)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
8 9 10
α β β β β β β
β β β β ε7  
LAF =    +   LTA +   Sub +   Current +   Quick +   DTA 
+   ROI +   YE +   Foreign +   Loss +   Brand +   NB6Spec 
+   B6 Spec +                                                                                            (2)
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 8 9 10 11
12
α β β β β β
β β β β β β
β ε
7  
(3)                                        + Brand  + Loss  +Foreign   + YE  +






(4)                                         + Specialist  + Loss  +Foreign   + YE  +







LAF = natural logarithm of total audit fees (£’000), 
LTA = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000), 
Sub = square root of the total number of subsidiaries, 
Current = ratio of current assets to current liabilities, 
Quick = ratio of current assets less stock, to current liabilities, 
DTA = ratio of long term debt to total assets, 
ROI = ratio of earnings before interest and tax tot total assets, 
YE = dummy variable, 1 indicates a financial year end between December and  March, 0 otherwise, 
Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that represent foreign operations, 
Loss = dummy variable, 1 indicates operating loss reported in any of the three prior years, 0 otherwise  
Auditor = auditor indicator variable, 1 indicates a Big Six firm, 0 otherwise, 
Brand = auditor indicator variable, 1 indicates a Big Six auditor, 0 otherwise, 
NB6Spec= auditor indicator variable, 1 indicates a Non Big Six specialist, 0 otherwise,  
B6Spec = auditor indicator variable, 1 indicates a Big Six specialist, 0 otherwise, 
Specialist = auditor indicator variable, 1 indicates an industry specialist, 0 otherwise, 
AFSI Spec = continuous measure of the accounting firm share of the industry variable.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
financial clients. We include a year end dummy because UK accounting firms are particularly busy between 
December to March and clients might be required to pay premium fees during this period. 
11 This definition is consistent with the Craswell et al study. The continuous DAI variable is found by computing 
the ratio of the accounting firm’s audit fees within an industry to the total industry audit fees.  
12 The continuous AFSI industry specialist variable is found by computing the ratio of the accounting firm’s 
audit fees within an industry to the total amount of audit fees within their portfolio of clients.  
(5)                                         + Spec AFSI  + Loss  +Foreign   + YE  +







Consistent with the early Big Six premium studies, the first series of results, 
documented in Table 3, are a test of hypothesis H1. This is a benchmark test of model 1, to 
examine whether the audit fees charged by Big Six firms are higher than non Big Six fees. 
Since there is some evidence of heteroskedasticity, the following results are presented using 
the White (1980) error correction process. Model 1 has very good explanatory power, as 
shown by the F and adjusted R² statistics and the findings are robust across different control 
variables13. We find that the LTA, Sub, Current and Foreign variables are significant in the 
hypothesised direction. As predicted, the Auditor dummy is significant at p<0.05, indicating 
that the average audit fees charged by Big Six auditors from 1985 to 1995 are 10.3% to 
23.2% higher than the fees of their non Big Six counterparts14. These rents are lower than 
those reported by Palmrose (1986a), Craswell et al (1995) and DeFond et al (1996) but may 
not fully represent the brand name premium because industry specialisation has been ignored. 
The tests of hypotheses H2 to H7 assess whether the returns to brand name and 
industry specialist reputations are significant. For our initial investigation, we classify 
industries using a one digit SIC scheme and report the DAI (AFSI) specialists in Table 4 
Panel A (Table 4 Panel B). Most of the industry specialisation occurs in the consumer goods, 
general industrials and wholesale and merchandising sectors. As expected, the Big Six 
accounting firms are the dominant industry specialists. KPMG have developed the greatest 
amount of specialist expertise, followed by Price Waterhouse, Ernst and Young, Touche 
Ross, Coopers and Lybrand and Arthur Andersen. Unsurprisingly, the international 
accounting firms that were subsumed during the mergers that took place in the period, Arthur 
                                                          
13 Craswell et al (1995) use the ratio of current assets to total assets variable and several studies use the 
logarithm of sales revenue to proxy for size. The above results are not sensitive to the choice of proxy.  
14 We compute the Big Six premium using the formula outlined in footnote 7 by Simon and Francis (1988).  
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Young and Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, have the least amount of specialist expertise. Unlike 
Craswell et al (1995), we find that two non Big Six firms meet the specialist criteria15.  
In Table 4 Panel C, we report the results of our analyses of hypotheses H1 to H3. We 
report our findings using the AFSI specialists and the Palmrose (1986a) methodology (model 
2) but do not document the results for the Craswell et al (1995) methodology and/or the DAI 
specialist definition because these are not significantly different. The F and adjusted R-square 
statistics indicate that the model has very good explanatory power. Similar to the Big Six 
pricing analysis, the LTA, Sub, Current and Foreign variables are significant in the 
hypothesised direction. The parameter estimates indicate that brand name returns are 
significant at p<0.05 in 1987, 1991, 1992 and 1995. However, unlike Craswell et al, DeFond 
et al and Matthews et al, we find that returns to Big Six and non Big Six industry 
specialisation reputations are not significant. These results support the brand name 
component of the Big Six premium but do not back the industry specialisation element.   
 We run a number of further tests to examine whether we have failed to accurately 
capture industry specialisation or if the returns to reputations are insignificant. First, since the 
dichotomous definitions of specialisation choose an essentially arbitrary hurdle rate, we run 
sensitivity analyses using the steeper AFSI 30% and DAI 20% specifications. As one would 
expect, this alternative proxy produced fewer specialist industries and auditors. We present 
only the AFSI results, in Table 5 Panel A, since the findings using the Craswell et al 
methodology and/or the DAI definition are not statistically different. The explanatory power 
of the models is good and the LTA, Sub, Current and Foreign variables are significant in the 
predicted direction. Similar to our earlier analyses, the returns to brand name reputations are 
significant at p<0.05 in 1987 and 1990 to 1995. Unlike most of the prior literature, the 
industry specialist returns are not significantly correlated with audit fees.  
                                                          
15 Craswell et al find only Big Six specialists. BDO Binder Hamlyn and Grant Thornton meet our criteria. 
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All of the audit pricing studies measure industry specialisation using a dichotomous 
variable, however Krishnan and Yang (1998) capture industry specialisation with a 
continuous variable. One explanation for our insignificant results might be that accounting 
firms choose to invest different amounts in the development of specialist expertise such that 
firms have degrees of reputation. The results of our analysis using a continuous definition of 
specialisation are documented in Table 5 Panel B. The LTA, Sub, Current and Foreign 
variables are significantly correlated with audit fees and the explanatory power of the models 
is good. The brand name dummy is significant at p<0.05 in 1987, 1990 to 1992, 1994 and 
1995. There is some evidence of a significant industry specialisation variable at p<0.05 from 
1988 to 1990, 1994 and 1995 but these results are not consistent across both models.     
In section 1, we note that a small number of firms have the incentive to invest in 
specialist reputations in small industries because the potential returns are limited but many 
firms may credibly claim to possess industry specialist reputations in large industries. We test 
whether the one digit SIC scheme is too general by estimating the returns to brand name and 
industry specialisation reputations using a two digit SIC scheme. In Table 6 Panel A, we 
observe that most of the variation in audit fees is captured by the same ratios and the 
explanatory power of the models is good. The brand name dummy variable is significant at 
p<0.05 in 1986, 1987 and from 1990 to 1995 but industry specialisation is not significant.    
Our analysis examines industry specialisation across all industries but the prior 
literature focuses on a limited number of industries where one might expect specialisation to 
develop16. We replicate these studies by restricting our sample to the following ‘finer’ 
industries: agricultural products, mineral extraction, utilities and leisure and other service 
industries. These results, reported in Table 6 Panel B, reveal that most of the variation in 
                                                          
16 Palmrose considered alcoholic beverages, office equipment, transportation, communications, utilities, retail 
and financials. Craswell et al and Matthews et al focus on mining, mineral extraction, construction, household 
goods, chemicals,  engineering, transportation and financials. DeFond take their sample from the population of 
industrial clients. 
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audit fees is explained by same control variables and the explanatory power of the models is 
good. For our restricted industry sample, brand name returns are significant at p<0.05 in 
1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994 and 1995. Consistent with our earlier work, the returns 
to industry specialisation reputations are not significantly different from zero.  
We extend our analysis by examining whether the Big Six premium is driven by 
industry specialist returns for a sub-sample of small clients. The rationale for this appraisal is 
that large clients may only be able hire a Big Six firm because of their need for resources but 
small clients might choose to hire a Big Six firm only if they offer industry specialist 
knowledge. To avoid sample selection bias, we take the lowest quartile of clients based on 
their total assets and report the results in Table 6 Panel C. Similar to our earlier findings, the 
explanatory power is reasonably good and the LTA, Sub, Current and Foreign variables are 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable. Unlike our prior work, the returns to 
brand name reputations are only significant at p<0.05 in 1995 but industry specialist returns 
are significant in 1986, 1994 and 1995. These findings suggest that the demand for an 
accounting firm with a brand name reputation ‘bottoms out’ below a critical size. There is 
some evidence that small clients may only be willing to pay premium fees if the Big Six firm 
provides industry specialist expertise.  
DeFond et al (1996) and Matthews et al (1998) test for evidence of returns to non Big 
Six industry specialisation and the results have been mixed17. Our results for the restricted 
sample of non Big Six audited clients are reported in Table 6 Panel D. The explanatory power 
of the models is good and most of the variation of audit fees is explained by the same  
variables. Consistent with our earlier analyses, the returns to industry specialist reputations 
are not significant.  
                                                          
17 DeFond et al report that a non Big Six industry specialist in Hong Kong, Kwan Wong Tan & Fong, charge 
lower fees than both their Big Six and non Big Six non specialist counterparts. Matthews et al analyse the 
Australian market and report that specialist non Big Six auditors earn a premium over their non specialist non 
Big Six counterparts. 
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5. Econometric Analysis  
Simunic (1980) questions the level of competitiveness in the audit market, one of the 
fundamental assumptions required to explain the Big Six premium in terms of brand name 
and industry specialisation reputations. Using the Craswell et al (1995) methodology, we test 
the level of competition by comparing proxies for market share and company size. For the 
full sample, the Big Six market share is 73% and total assets range from £355,000 to £22,565 
million. Mean client size is £475,871,000 but the median size is just £98,055,000. The large 
sub-sample of clients have median assets of £911,022,000 and the Big Six market share is 
80%. The smaller sub-sample have median assets of £40,740,000 and a Big Six market share 
of 66%. The UK Big Six audit firms are more dominant than their Australian counterparts. 
The Big Six firms allege that the audit market is very competitive, positing evidence of strong 
competition for initial audit tenders. However, the rate of auditor rotation is low and we can 
not exclude the possibility that the premium relates to the exercise of market power. 
Simunic (1980), Francis and Stokes (1986) and Palmrose (1986a) find that the audit 
pricing model specification is sensitive to company size. Using a Chow test, we test the 
structural consistency of the models across the large and small client sub-samples and find 
that most of the model parameters remain consistent. The regression results, reported in Table 
6 Panel E, indicate that the brand name premium is significant for both the upper and lower 
halves although it is greater for the smaller sector.   
To examine the possible powerful effect of individual firms or industries, we re-
estimate the Big Six pricing regression, model 1, dropping each of the Big Six firms and the 
various industries sequentially. This paper does not disclose these results because they are 
quantitatively similar to those reported above but the implication is that the results are not 
dominated by particular firms or industries.  
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In section 2, we note that there is considerable evidence of a positive correlation 
between audit and non audit service fees and researchers have struggled to explain the reason 
for such an association. To assess the importance of non audit fees, we first examine the size 
of the respective markets by documenting the aggregate audit and non audit service fees 
across industries in Table 6 Panel F. It is immediately evident that the is a vast difference 
between the size of the various industries and that non audit service fees are a significant part 
of the total remuneration across all industries. This table also suggest that one must consider 
non audit fees in addition to audit fee specialisation because firms may be selling a joint 
product.  
One rationale for the above puzzling relationship is that clients are willing to pay an 
audit fee premium for the provision of specialist non audit services. To test for such evidence, 
we define industry specialisation based on the size of non audit service fees and report the 
findings in Table 6 Panel G. The same variables explain most of the audit fee variation and 
the goodness of fit of the models is strong. Unlike our earlier analyses, both the brand name 
and industry specialisation returns are not significantly different from zero. For robustness, 
we use the total auditors’ remuneration to determine industry specialisation but since the 
results are not dissimilar we do not disclose them in this paper. 
The observed positive association between audit and non audit service fees raises the 
possibility that the Big Six premium may be driven by a correlated omitted non audit fee. 
Consistent with Craswell et al (1995), we change the dependent variable in the Big Six 
pricing analysis, model 1, to the logarithm of total remuneration. We detect a strong 
correlation between the logarithm of remuneration and the Big Six dummy. Therefore our 
tests of the importance of non audit fee are inconclusive. To summarise, our results suggest 
that UK accounting firms earn premium fees in relation to their brand name reputation but 
there is scant evidence of returns to industry specialist reputations.  
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper reports strong evidence of a Big Six premium for a large sample of UK 
clients over the period 1985 to 1995. Recent studies explain these rents as returns to brand 
name and industry specialisation reputations. This study extends the prior work by 
performing a deep examination of the concept of specialisation, improving the definitions of 
industry specialisation and refining the methodology. Consistent with the prior literature, we 
find evidence of significant brand name returns for the majority of our sub-samples. 
However, brand name returns are insignificant for the small client market and if one defines 
industry specialisation based on the level of the non audit service fees. We believe that brand 
name reputations “bottom out” below a critical client size due to the client’s inability to bear 
the cost of a quality auditor. The insignificant brand name results for the non audit fee 
defined specialists may be due to an interrelationship between audit and non audit pricing.  
Unlike the prior work, we find that industry specialist returns are insignificant. There 
are various possible explanations for this conflict. First, there may be institutional or 
regulatory differences which prevent specialist reputations from being developed in the UK. 
Second, the nature of the markets studied and samples selected differ between the studies. In 
particular, the importance of the financial clients to the results documented in the prior work 
is not clear. Finally, since the markets are larger in the UK, there is some evidence to suggest 
that the UK Big Six firms may be large enough to specialise across all industries.  
There are a number of interesting areas open for future research. First, since the UK 
accounting firms are much larger than their Australian counterparts, it is important to 
consider the possibility of the use of oligopoly market power. Second, the relationship 
between audit and non audit service fees is worthy of further analysis because our results are 
mixed. Finally, there are a number of other motivations for the Big Six premium that have 
been ignored in the literature, for example the “deep pockets hypothesis”.    
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Table 3 Multivariate audit fee regression model: estimation of the Big Six premium; 
 
Predicted Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Auditor N F R sq. 
Sign  + + - + + - + + + +    
1985 -3.148 0.598 0.185 0.071 0.269 1.273 -0.613 0.190 -0.045 -0.103 0.126 225 113.6 0.838 
 (9.58) (19.72) (8.27) (0.74) (2.08) (2.17) (1.33) (1.41) (0.57) (1.28) (1.61)    
1986 -2.867 0.559 0.222 0.181 -0.092 0.202 -0.035 0.359 0.046 0.021 0.139 288 124.4 0.811 
 (9.08) (19.14) (10.01) (2.05) (0.91) (0.40) (0.08) (3.20) (0.60) (0.26) (1.87)    
1987 -2.362 0.515 0.233 0.012 0.096 0.182 -0.023 0.364 0.017 0.134 0.209 358 138.9 0.794 
 (7.91) (18.78) (11.35) (0.15) (1.02) (0.380 (0.04) (2.54) (0.25) (1.14) (2.99)    
1988 -2.642 0.553 0.232 -0.078 0.103 -0.187 1.086 0.342 0.035 -0.003 0.098 430 180.2 0.807 
 (10.14) (24.01) (12.77) (1.17) (1.31) (0.51) (2.32) (2.73) (0.56) (0.03) (1.59)    
1989 -2.482 0.554 0.209 -0.093 0.061 -0.591 0.641 0.347 0.075 0.176 0.125 446 174.4 0.796 
 (9.33) (23.69) (11.36) (1.70) (0.86) (1.88) (1.57) (2.65) (1.20) (1.56) (2.00)    
1990 -1.484 0.465 0.246 -0.109 0.080 0.196 0.225 0.314 0.061 0.060 0.116 473 194.0 0.804 
 (6.13) (21.46) (14.43) (2.47) (1.16) (0.76) (0.59) (2.75) (1.06) (0.55) (1.98)    
1991 -0.930 0.424 0.254 -0.176 0.126 0.147 -0.467 0.440 0.123 -0.013 0.139 496 207.6 0.807 
 (4.20) (21.20) (15.35) (3.53) (1.86) (0.66) (1.80) (4.04) (2.29) (0.14) (2.44)    
1992 -0.727 0.404 0.251 -0.095 0.023 0.326 -0.320 0.543 0.065 -0.020 0.150 488 200.1 0.804 
 (3.50) (20.99) (14.84) (1.95) (0.42) (1.83) (4.15) (5.26) (1.19) (0.28) (2.55)    
1993 -0.810 0.415 0.243 -0.155 0.085 0.273 0.067 0.635 0.030 0.086 0.112 488 217.4 0.816 
 (3.94) (21.55) (14.93) (3.07) (1.42) (1.23) (0.35) (6.76) (0.55) (1.18) (1.85)    
1994 -0.703 0.414 0.244 -0.177 0.061 -0.030 -0.303 0.636 0.051 0.063 0.124 461 196.0 0.809 
 (3.31) (21.18) (14.92) (3.70) (1.03) (0.15) (1.30) (6.20) (0.93) (0.85) (1.96)    
1995 -0.771 0.405 0.245 -0.134 0.075 0.185 -0.582 0.658 0.086 -0.077 0.161 485 228.5 0.825 
 (3.77) (21.34) (15.28) (3.06) (1.31)  (1.63) (3.04) (6.99) (1.64) (1.02) (2.52)    
Pool -1.425 0.465 0.234 -0.112 0.081 0.171 -0.336 0.489 0.054 0.023 0.148 4638 1884.6 0.803 
 (19.93) (70.09) (43.13) (6.66) (3.87) (2.45) (5.78) (14.38) (2.98) (0.91) (7.70)    
 
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Auditor = dummy variable, big six auditor = 1, 0 otherwise. 
DTA  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets 
  
Table 4 Panel A UK industries with DAI specialist auditors 
SIC 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
1 KP,TR KP,TR KP,TR DH,KP,TR DH,KP,TR CL,EY,KP,TR CL,KP,TR CL,EY,KP,TR CL,EY,KP,TR CL,EY,KP CL,EY,KP,TR 
2 KP,PW KP,PW EW,KP,PW KP,PW KP,PW CL,EY,KP,PW CL,EY,KP CL,EY,KP,PW CL,EY,KP,PW CL,EY,KP,PW CL,EY,KP,PW 





DH,KP,PW DH,KP,PW KP,PW DH,KP,PW CL,KP,PW CL,KP,PW CL,KP, PW CL,KP,PW CL,KP, PW CL,KP,PW 
7 EW,KP EW,KP  PW EY,KP,PW CL,EY,PW CL,EY,KP,PW CL,EY,KP,PW CL,KP,PW CL,KP, PW CL,KP,PW 
1 KP KP KP KP KP KP CL,KP KP KP CL,KP KP 
2    KP KP KP KP KP KP KP KP 
3         KP KP KP 
5 KP KP KP KP       KP 
 
Table 4 Panel B UK industries with AFSI specialist auditors 
SIC 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 













AA, CL, EY, 
KP, PW 
CL, EY, KP, 
PW  
AA, CL, EY, 
KP, PW, TR 
AA, CL, KP, 
PW 
AA, CL, EY, 
KP, PW, BH 







TR, BH, GT 
AA,AY,CL, 
EW,DH,KP, 









AA, EY, KP, 
PW, TR, BH, 
GT 
AA, CL, EY, 
KP, TR, BH, 
GT 
AA, EY, KP, 
PW, TR, BH, 
GT  
AA, CL, EY, 
KP, PW, TR, 
BH, GT 
5 DH, KP DH, KP DH, GT GT   PW PW PW PW  
2 PW PW PW PW  GT  PW    
3 CL, TR CL, TR AA, AY, CL, 
TR, GT 
AA, AY, CL AY, TR, GT AA, TR,  TR, GT TR, BH, GT TR, BH, GT TR, BH, GT TR, GT 
5    GT        
SIC code 0 represents agricultural products, code 1 mineral extraction, code 2 consumer goods, code 3 general industrials, code 4 utilities, code 5 wholesale and merchandising,  
code 7 leisure services, code 8 is other services and code 9 denotes civil service. Audit partnerships are coded as follows, code NO represents no listed auditor, code AA, Arthur 
Andersen, AY, Arthur Young, code CL, Coopers and Lybrand or Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, code EW, Ernst and Whinney, code EY Ernst and Young, code DH, Deloitte 
Haskins and Sells, code KP, Peat Marwick Mitchell, KMG Thomson McLintock until 1/4/1987,Peat Marwick McLintock until 1/1/1990 or KPMG, code PW, Price Waterhouse, 
code TR, Touche Ross code O, any other partnership, code BH, Binder Hamlyn or BDO Binder Hamlyn, code GT, Grant Thornton, code MS, Moore Stephens, PK, Pannell Kerr 
Foster, SO, Spicer and Oppenheim and code J denotes joint auditors. 
  
Table 4 Panel C Multivariate audit fee regression models: joint estimation of the Big Six brand name and industry specialisation premium  
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq.
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1985 -3.143 0.598 0.185 0.069 0.271 1.292 -0.612 0.190 -0.047 -0.100 0.114 0.023  225 102.844 0.83 
 (9.53) (19.63) (8.25) (0.71) (2.08) (2.19) (1.33) (1.41) (0.59) (1.23) (1.28) (0.26)     
1986 -2.881 0.558 0.228 0.176 -0.088 0.198 0.099 0.352 0.025 0.048 0.100 0.091  288 111.251 0.81 
 (9.02) (18.97) (10.17) (1.98) (0.87) (0.39) (0.22) (3.12) (0.31) (0.58) (1.18) (1.06)     
1987 -2.338 0.510 0.236 -0.000 0.101 0.343 0.086 0.326 -0.006 0.138 0.166 0.130  358 125.695 0.80 
 (7.80) (18.50) (11.28) (0.00) (1.06) (0.71) (0.16) (2.25) (0.09) (1.17) (2.17) (1.80)     
1987 -2.321 0.516 0.233 0.004 0.089 0.241 -0.012 0.308 0.007 0.112 0.076 -0.219 0.427 358 117.092 0.80 
 (7.79) (18.75) (11.13) (0.05) (0.94) (0.50) (0.02) (2.14) (0.10) (0.95) (0.89) (1.30) (2.29)    
1988 -2.572 0.547 0.235 -0.085 0.079 -0.120 1.018 0.363 0.039 0.013 0.062 0.091  430 164.318 0.81 
 (9.76) (23.48) (12.77) (1.27) (1.00) (0.32) (2.16) (2.89) (0.63) (0.12) (0.92) (1.43)     
1988 -2.563 0.548 0.234 -0.083 0.077 -0.126 0.992 0.360 0.040 0.007 0.044 -0.017 0.123 430 150.449 0.81 
 (9.70) (23.47) (12.64) (1.23) (0.97) (0.34) (2.10) (2.86) (0.65) (0.06) (0.60) (0.10) (0.65)    
1989 -2.482 0.553 0.211 -0.100 0.082 -0.409 0.576 0.332 0.081 0.161 0.089 0.054  446 157.385 0.80 
 (9.12) (23.04) (11.23) (1.82) (1.13) (1.24) (1.40) (2.51) (1.28) (1.41) (1.31) (0.86)     
1989 -2.482 0.554 0.210 -0.099 0.081 -0.415 0.580 0.332 0.081 0.162 0.080 0.008 0.054 446 143.968 0.80 
 (9.11) (22.96) (11.15) (1.80) (1.12) (1.25) (1.40) (2.50) (1.29) (1.42) (1.07) (0.05) (0.30)    
1990 -1.477 0.463 0.246 -0.110 0.080 0.213 0.196 0.324 0.072 0.048 0.116 0.022  473 175.163 0.81 
 (5.90) (20.62) (14.07) (2.48) (1.15) (0.80) (0.51) (2.79) (1.23) (0.43) (1.91) (0.38)     
1990 -1.477 0.463 0.246 -0.110 0.080 0.212 0.198 0.323 0.072 0.048 0.112 0.004 0.022 473 160.219 0.80 
 (5.89) (20.55) (14.02) (2.48) (1.15) (0.79) (0.52) (2.78) (1.24) (0.43) (1.67) (0.03) (0.14)    
1991 -0.901 0.422 0.253 -0.181 0.125 0.177 -0.461 0.451 0.127 0.002 0.135 0.019  496 188.147 0.81 
 (3.99) (20.54) (14.98) (3.65) (1.84) (0.77) (1.76) (4.13) (2.36) (0.02) (2.21) (0.33)     
1991 -0.909 0.421 0.254 -0.183 0.129 0.172 -0.458 0.446 0.126 -0.006 0.161 0.364 -0.368 496 173.185 0.81 
 (4.03) (20.54) (15.02) (3.69) (1.89) (0.75) (1.75) (4.09) (2.33) (0.06) (2.55) (1.56) (1.55)    
1992 -0.696 0.400 0.253 -0.098 0.021 0.349 -0.318 0.542 0.071 -0.018 0.136 0.041  488 182.171 0.81 
 (3.30) (20.26) (14.72) (2.00) (0.38) (1.94) (4.14) (5.22) (1.30) (0.26) (2.20) (0.75)     
1992 -0.697 0.400 0.253 -0.098 0.021 0.348 -0.318 0.542 0.071 -0.018 0.137 0.048 -0.008 488 166.636 0.80 
 (3.29) (20.24) (14.69) (2.00) (0.38) (1.94) (4.14) (5.21) (1.29) (0.26) (2.03) (0.31) (0.05)    
1993 -0.802 0.413 0.244 -0.162 0.104 0.306 0.076 .625 0.036 0.082 0.103 0.033  488 194.731 0.82 
 (3.80) (20.78) (14.62) (3.18) (1.66) (1.36) (0.39) (6.51) (0.64) (1.12) (1.61) (0.61)     
1993 -0.809 0.412 0.243 -0.162 0.105 0.305 0.078 0.624 0.035 0.078 0.120 0.125 -0.103 488 178.289 0.82 
 (3.82) (20.76) (14.55) (3.18) (1.68) (1.35) (0.41) (6.49) (0.63) (1.08) (1.71) (0.77) (0.60)    
1994 -0.758 0.420 0.238 -0.185 0.079 -0.016 -0.305 0.601 0.042 0.059 0.110 0.085  461 177.983 0.81 
 (3.56) (21.37) (14.34) (3.85) (1.30) (0.08) (1.31) (5.81) (0.76) (0.80) (1.72) (1.54)     
  
 Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq. 
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1994 -0.768 0.420 0.237 -0.184 0.081 -0.010 -0.310 0.599 0.042 0.056 0.129 0.170 -0.097 461 162.947 0.81 
 (3.59) (21.33) (14.30) (3.85) (1.34) (0.04) (1.33) (5.78) (0.76) (0.74) (1.81) (1.12) (0.60)    
1995 -0.808 0.410 0.241 -0.135 0.071 0.180 -0.579 0.630 0.081 -0.070 0.127 0.106  485 209.464 0.83 
 (3.94) (21.50) (14.99) (3.09) (1.24) (1.59) (3.03) (6.60) (1.54) (0.94) (1.93) (2.02)     
1995 -0.821 0.409 0.240 -0.136 0.074 0.181 -0.576 0.627 0.079 -0.074 0.151 0.238 -0.146 485 191.950 0.83 
 (4.00) (21.48) (14.95) (3.12) (1.29) (1.59) (3.02) (6.59) (1.50) (0.98) (2.10) (1.44) (0.84)    
Pool -1.348 0.458 0.238 -0.121 0.080 0.180 -0.328 0.495 0.057 0.036 0.127 0.059  4638 1633.191 0.81 
 (18.20) (66.39) (41.89) (7.13) (3.73) (2.55) (5.56) (14.07) (3.02) (1.36) (6.08) (3.12)     
Pool -1.348 0.457 0.238 -0.121 0.080 0.180 -0.328 0.495 0.057 0.036 0.128 0.066 -0.008 4638 1496.754 0.81 
 (18.18) (66.34) (41.88) (7.13) (3.73) (2.55) (5.56) (14.07) (3.02) (1.36) (5.67) (1.22) (0.14)    
 
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Brand = dummy variable, big six auditor = 1, 0 otherwise; 
DTA  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   Specialist =dummy variable, industry specialist =1, 0 otherwise;   
ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; B6Spec  = dummy variable, Big Six specialist =1. 0 otherwise. 
  
Table 5 Panel A Multivariate audit fee regression models with AFSI specialists defined at the 30% level:  
 
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DE ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1985 -3.144 0.598 0.185 0.071 0.268 1.283 -0.607 0.188 -0.044 -0.103 0.123 0.018  225 102.816 0.84 
 (9.51) (19.57) (8.25) (0.73) (2.06) (2.17) (1.31) (1.39) (0.55) (1.28) (1.53) (0.14)     
1986 -2.887 0.559 0.227 0.179 -0.092 0.199 0.081 0.350 0.033 0.040 0.127 0.090  288 110.973 0.81 
 (9.03) (18.98) (10.13) (2.02) (0.90) (0.39) (0.18) (3.07) (0.43) (0.50) (1.66) (0.75)     
1987 -2.324 0.510 0.238 0.003 0.098 0.276 0.046 0.333 0.001 0.137 0.211 0.066  358 124.426 0.79 
 (7.72) (18.41) (11.33) (0.04) (1.03) (0.57) (0.09) (2.29) (0.02) (1.17) (2.95) (0.67)     
1987 -2.324 0.511 0.237 0.008 0.091 0.245 0.005 0.335 0.005 0.133 0.195 -0.207 0.302 358 114.082 0.79 
 (7.71) (18.43) (11.31) (0.10) (0.96) (0.50) (0.01) (2.30) (0.07) (1.13) (2.65) (0.67) (0.93)    
1988 -2.546 0.545 0.237 -0.082 0.081 -0.148 0.993 0.370 0.040 0.009 0.093 0.066  430 163.587 0.81 
 (9.67) (23.39) (12.90) (1.21) (1.02) (0.40) (2.11) (2.94) (0.63) (0.09) (1.47) (0.74)     
1988 -2.542 0.545 0.237 -0.081 0.081 -0.141 0.984 0.368 0.040 0.008 0.089 -0.005 0.081 430 149.625 0.81 
 (9.63) (23.36) (12.82) (1.21) (1.02) (0.38) (2.08) (2.92) (0.64) (0.07) (1.37) (0.02) (0.29)    
1989 -2.469 0.552 0.211 -0.101 0.087 -0.394 0.556 0.328 0.083 0.158 0.108 0.102  446 157.337 0.80 
 (9.10) (23.07) (11.28) (1.83) (1.20) (1.19) (1.36) (2.46) (1.32) (1.39) (1.70) (0.79)     
1989 -2.459 0.552 0.213 -0.100 0.085 -0.402 0.543 0.315 0.087 0.161 0.093 -0.132 0.316 446 144.391 0.80 
 (9.06) (23.06) (11.33) (1.80) (1.18) (1.21) (1.32) (2.36) (1.39) (1.40) (1.43) (0.53) (1.09)    
1990 -1.445 0.461 0.247 -0.109 0.078 0.194 0.172 0.337 0.076 0.048 0.124 -0.099  473 175.447 0.81 
 (5.81) (20.66) (14.20) (2.44) (1.12) (0.72) (0.45) (2.92) (1.30) (0.43) (2.09) (0.86)     
1990 -1.449 0.461 0.247 -0.109 0.078 0.190 0.184 0.335 0.075 0.048 0.120 -0.169 0.088 473 160.511 0.81 
 (5.82) (20.55) (14.09) (2.44) (1.12) (0.70) (0.48) (2.90) (1.29) (0.43) (1.98) (0.65) (0.30)    
1991 -0.902 0.421 0.254 -0.182 0.126 0.172 -0.457 0.452 0.128 0.002 0.143 0.020  496 188.105 0.81 
 (3.98) (20.43) (15.02) (3.65) (1.85) (0.76) (1.74) (4.13) (2.37) (0.02) (2.50) (0.16)     
1991 -0.891 0.419 0.255 -0.181 0.130 0.163 -0.477 0.453 0.128 -0.012 0.165 0.364 -0.485 496 173.490 0.81 
 (3.93) (20.29) (15.11) (3.65) (1.92) (0.72) (1.82) (4.15) (2.36) (0.13) (2.82) (1.59) (1.78)    
1992 -0.664 0.397 0.255 -0.094 0.019 0.337 -0.317 0.558 0.074 -0.024 0.148 -0.052  488 182.097 0.81 
 (3.14) (20.15) (14.85) (1.94) (0.34) (1.88) (4.41) (5.39) (1.35) (0.34) (2.52) (0.63)     
1992 -0.670 0.397 0.255 -0.094 0.019 0.333 -0.319 0.558 0.073 -0.025 0.164 0.045 -0.136 488 166.810 0.81 
 (3.16) (20.12) (14.81) (1.92) (0.33) (1.85) (4.15) (5.39) (1.33) (0.36) (2.62) (0.29) (0.74)    
1993 -0.795 0.412 0.245 -0.160 0.103 0.310 0.066 0.630 0.037 0.078 0.116 0.018  488 194.558 0.82 
 (3.76) (20.74) (14.63) (3.15) (1.66) (1.38) (0.34) (6.56) (0.67) (1.07) (1.88) (0.16)     
1993 -0.797 0.410 0.245 -0.160 0.106 0.301 0.071 0.633 0.037 0.079 0.133 0.123 -0.196 488 178.330 0.82 
 (3.77) (20.62) (14.62) (3.14) (1.70) (1.34) (0.37) (6.58) (0.67) (1.08) (2.06) (0.75) (0.89)    
1994 -0.763 0.419 0.239 -0.183 0.085 -0.015 -0.300 0.616 0.045 0.055 0.149 0.196  461 177.412 0.81 
 (3.56) (21.30) (14.41) (3.83) (1.39) (0.07) (1.29) (6.00) (0.80) (0.73) (2.26) (1.09)     
1995 -0.781 0.405 0.244 -0.135 0.077 0.185 -0.587 0.659 0.085 -0.079 0.171 0.183  485 207.593 0.82 
 (3.81) (21.34) (15.23) (3.08) (1.34) (1.62) (3.06) (6.99) (1.61) (1.04) (2.62) (0.75)     
  
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DE ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
Pool -1.336 0.456 0.239 -0.120 0.081 0.176 -0.331 0.504 0.059 0.033 0.147 0.031  4638 1629.004 0.80 
 (18.03) (66.25) (42.16) (7.05) (3.78) (2.49) (5.60) (14.34) (3.17) (1.24) (7.41) (0.88)     
Pool -1.334 0.456 0.239 -0.120 0.081 0.175 -0.329 0.504 0.060 0.032 0.153 0.106 -0.100 4638 1493.547 0.80 
 (18.06) (66.22) (42.16) (7.06) (3.80) (2.48) (5.57) (14.35) (3.15) (1.22) (7.48) (1.50) (1.22)    
 
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Brand = dummy variable, big six auditor = 1, 0 otherwise; 
DE  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   Specialist =dummy variable, industry specialist =1, 0 otherwise;   
ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; B6Spec  = dummy variable, Big Six specialist =1. 0 otherwise. 
  
Table 5 Panel B Multivariate audit fee regression models with AFSI defined continuous specialists:  
 
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DE ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand AFSISpec B6spec N F R sq
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1985 -3.148 0.598 0.185 0.071 0.268 1.268 -0.613 0.190 -0.045 -0.102 0.126 0.152  225 102.804 0.84 
 (9.55) (19.65) (8.25) (0.73) (2.06) (2.09) (1.33) (1.40) (0.57) (1.27) (1.61) (0.03)     
1985 -3.125 0.598 0.188 0.053 0.284 1.335 -0.531 0.185 -0.050 -0.106 0.088 -18.772 21.138 225 94.618 0.84 
 (9.48) (19.68) (8.34) (0.54) (2.18) (2.19) (1.14) (1.37) (0.63) (1.31) (1.06) (1.16) (1.25)    
1986 -2.878 0.557 0.225 0.193 -0.097 0.070 0.051 0.367 0.032 0.039 0.136 6.170  288 111.413 0.81 
 (9.02) (18.92) (10.03) (2.16) (0.96) (0.14) (0.12) (3.26) (0.41) (0.48) (1.83) (1.20)     
1986 -2.866 0.558 0.226 0.184 -0.089 0.117 0.076 0.366 0.028 0.039 0.113 -3.764 11.464 288 102.062 0.81 
 (8.96) (18.92) (10.06) (2.04) (0.88) (0.22) (0.17) (3.25) (0.36) (0.47) (1.41) (0.29) (0.82)    
1987 -2.319 0.508 0.237 0.020 0.084 0.124 0.102 0.347 0.004 0.145 0.220 5.678  358 125.236 0.80 
 (7.72) (18.33) (11.28) (0.25) (0.88) (0.25) (0.19) (2.40) (0.06) (1.24) (3.13) (1.49)     
1987 -2.308 0.508 0.237 0.015 0.087 0.250 0.120 0.358 0.003 0.149 0.178 -6.161 15.341 358 115.844 0.79 
 (7.71) (18.42) (11.31) (0.19) (0.92) (0.51) (0.22) (2.48) (0.04) (1.27) (2.41) (0.82) (1.81)    
1988 -2.478 0.537 0.236 -0.056 0.064 -0.246 0.926 0.365 0.038 0.006 0.093 6.950  430 167.693 0.81 
 (9.48) (23.19) (12.96) (0.84) (0.82) (0.66) (1.99) (2.93) (0.62) (0.06) (1.50) (2.99)     
1988 -2.478 0.538 0.236 -0.056 0.064 -0.237 0.925 0.365 0.039 0.005 0.089 5.261 1.770 430 153.356 0.81 
 (9.47) (23.11) (12.93) (0.84) (0.82) (0.64) (1.98) (2.92) (0.62) (0.05) (1.35) (0.52) (0.17)    
1989 -2.380 0.543 0.211 -0.080 0.070 -0.533 0.546 0.329 0.085 0.170 0.104 5.484  446 161.926 0.80 
 (8.84) (22.81) (11.42) (1.46) (0.98) (1.63) (1.35) (2.51) (1.37) (1.50) (1.65) (3.25)     
1989 -2.379 0.542 0.212 -0.080 0.070 -0.547 0.548 0.331 0.084 0.170 0.111 8.121 -2.778 446 148.148 0.80 
 (8.82) (22.68) (11.41) (1.46) (0.98) (1.66) (1.35) (2.52) (1.36) (1.51) (1.68) (1.17) (0.39)    
1990 -1.460 0.462 0.247 -0.105 0.078 0.190 0.169 0.310 0.068 0.050 0.118 1.398  473 177.362 0.81 
 (5.92) (20.87) (14.23) (2.36) (1.13) (0.71) (0.44) (2.70) (1.17) (0.45) (1.99) (2.18)     
1990 -1.465 0.461 0.246 -0.103 0.078 0.167 0.174 0.311 0.068 0.050 0.127 3.722 -2.377 473 162.368 0.81 
 (5.94) (20.83) (14.19) (2.32) (1.13) (0.62) (0.46) (2.71) (1.17) (0.46) (2.07) (0.91) (0.58)    
1991 -0.903 0.421 0.253 -0.176 0.122 0.155 -0.452 0.445 0.126 0.007 0.139 0.930  496 189.162 0.81 
 (4.00) (20.62) (15.06) (3.55) (1.80) (0.68) (1.73) (4.09) (2.34) (0.07) (2.44) (1.48)     
1991 -0.902 0.421 0.253 -0.176 0.123 0.156 -0.451 0.445 0.126 0.007 0.139 0.729 0.203 496 173.033 0.81 
 (3.99) (20.58) (14.97) (3.55) (1.80) (0.68) (1.72) (4.09) (2.33) (0.07) (2.29) (0.10) (0.03)    
1992 -0.675 0.398 0.253 -0.093 0.019 0.328 -0.316 0.546 0.072 -0.028 0.148 0.784  488 182.585 0.81 
 (3.22) (20.32) (14.80) (1.90) (0.34) (1.82) (4.12) (5.30) (1.32) (0.40) (2.51) (1.19)     
1992 -0.654 0.398 0.257 -0.097 0.021 0.358 -0.326 0.546 0.072 -0.034 0.122 -7.224 8.143 488 168.346 0.80 
 (3.12) (20.33) (14.93) (2.00) (0.39) (1.99) (4.25) (5.30) (1.32) (0.49) (2.02) (1.56) (1.74)    
1993 -0.790 0.411 0.243 -0.154 0.102 0.305 0.051 0.624 0.036 0.070 0.109 1.132  488 195.925 0.82 
 (3.76) (20.90) (14.69) (3.05) (1.64) (1.36) (0.27) (6.55) (0.66) (0.96) (1.80) (1.65)     
1993 -0.803 0.411 0.243 -0.152 0.100 0.311 0.051 0.625 0.037 0.070 0.121 7.818 -6.697 488 179.312 0.82 
 (3.79) (20.89) (14.60) (2.99) (1.61) (1.38) (0.27) (6.55) (0.66) (0.96) (1.83) (0.53) (0.46)    
  
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DE ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand AFSISpec B6spec N F R sq
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1994 -0.742 0.418 0.239 -0.176 0.081 -0.033 -0.292 0.614 0.045 0.050 0.129 1.218  461 178.252 0.81 
 (3.49) (21.28) (14.48) (3.68) (1.34) (0.16) (1.26) (5.99) (0.81) (0.67) (2.05) (1.71)     
1994 -0.721 0.414 0.239 -0.173 0.076 -0.016 -0.316 0.614 0.042 0.051 0.156 5.050 -4.320 461 164.721 0.81 
 (3.39) (21.05) (14.52) (3.61) (1.26) (0.08) (1.36) (6.01) (0.76) (0.69) (2.42) (2.40) (1.94)    
1995 -0.796 0.407 0.239 -0.116 0.066 0.128 -0.602 0.649 0.085 -0.094 0.158 3.499  485 217.890 0.83 
 (3.96) (21.85) (15.16) (2.68) (1.17) (1.14) (3.20) (7.03) (1.65) (1.27) (2.53) (4.47)     
1995 -0.795 0.406 0.238 -0.115 0.065 0.130 -0.600 0.653 0.085 -0.093 0.164 4.607 -1.194 485 199.390 0.83 
 (3.95) (21.74) (15.07) (2.66) (1.15) (1.16) (3.19) (7.02) (1.64) (1.25) (2.55) (1.59) (0.40)    
Pool -1.407 0.462 0.235 -0.107 0.083 0.165 -0.338 0.479 0.056 0.019 0.146 1.739  4638 1727.361 0.81 
 (19.57) (69.05) (42.88) (6.40) (3.95) (2.35) (5.81) (14.09) (3.05) (0.75) (7.60) (6.25)     
Pool -1.407 0.462 0.235 -0.106 0.082 0.162 -0.337 0.479 0.056 0.019 0.151 3.080 -1.391 4638 1583.474 0.81 
 (19.57) (68.91) (42.83) (6.35) (3.92) (2.32) (5.79) (14.10) (3.04) (0.77) (7.62) (2.19) (0.97)    
 
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Brand = dummy variable, big six auditor = 1, 0 otherwise; 
DE  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   AFSISpec = continuous measure of the non Big Six firm’s share of the industry;   
ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; B6Spec  = continuous measure of the Big Six firm’s share of the industry. 
  
Table 6 Panel A Multivariate audit fee regression models using two digit SIC industry codes  
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1985 -3.117 0.596 0.184 0.062 0.270 1.328 -0.605 0.186 -0.052 -0.101 0.131 0.210 225 103.597 0.84
 (9.46) (19.62) (8.21) (0.64) (2.08) (2.26) (1.32) (1.38) (0.66) (1.25) (1.69) (1.17)     
1985 -3.103 0.594 0.183 0.063 0.273 1.346 -0.600 0.186 -0.050 -0.101 0.140 0.313 -0.182 225 94.641 0.84 
 (9.37) (19.36) (8.12) (0.65) (2.11) (2.29) (1.30) (1.38) (0.63) (1.25) (1.75) (1.14) (0.50)    
1986 -2.867 0.557 0.222 0.174 -0.096 0.266 0.090 0.369 0.029 0.062 0.155 0.350  288 112.536 0.81 
 (9.02) (19.02) (9.84) (1.97) (0.95) (0.52) (0.20) (3.29) (0.37) (0.75) (2.07) (1.92)     
1986 -2.859 0.555 0.219 0.177 -0.099 0.249 0.102 0.378 0.037 0.065 0.175 0.569 -0.465 288 103.552 0.80 
 (9.00) (18.94) (9.69) (2.01) (0.99) (0.49) (0.23) (3.37) (0.47) (0.79) (2.29) (2.29) (1.29)    
1987 -2.299 0.505 0.241 0.003 0.089 0.277 0.051 0.344 0.006 0.148 0.243 0.808  358 126.632 0.79 
 (7.68) (18.31) (11.56) (0.04) (0.94) (0.58) (0.10) (2.39) (0.09) (1.27) (3.44) (2.30)     
1988 -2.542 0.544 0.237 -0.081 0.080 -0.156 0.977 0.371 0.043 0.004 0.100 0.020  430 163.324 0.81 
 (9.65) (23.34) (12.87) (1.21) (1.03) (0.42) (2.07) (2.94) (0.70) (0.04) (1.60) (0.10)     
1988 -2.536 0.544 0.237 -0.082 0.082 -0.155 0.987 0.366 0.043 0.003 0.097 -0.083 0.166 430 149.415 0.81 
 (9.60) (23.25) (12.86) (1.22) (1.04) (0.41) (2.09) (2.89) (0.70) (0.03) (1.54) (0.25) (0.39)    
1989 -2.451 0.551 0.212 -0.104 0.084 -0.409 0.540 0.332 0.081 0.161 0.104 0.523  446 158.126 0.79 
 (9.05) (23.10) (11.40) (1.88) (1.16) (1.24) (1.32) (2.51) (1.29) (1.41) (1.64) (1.53)     
1990 -1.472 0.462 0.247 -0.111 0.081 0.221 0.215 0.317 0.071 0.053 0.128 0.745  473 175.920 0.80 
 (5.95) (20.82) (14.18) (2.51) (1.16) (0.83) (0.56) (2.75) (1.22) (0.48) (2.16) (1.31)     
1991 -0.892 0.421 0.253 -0.183 0.127 0.171 -0.467 0.448 0.128 -0.008 0.146 0.447  496 188.407 0.81 
 (3.95) (20.55) (15.06) (3.69) (1.87) (0.75) (1.78) (4.11) (2.37) (0.09) (2.55) (0.80)     
1992 -0.677 0.398 0.254 -0.097 0.021 0.345 -0.319 0.548 0.072 -0.027 0.153 0.314  488 182.061 0.81 
 (3.22) (20.30) (14.84) (1.99) (0.38) (1.92) (4.15) (5.30) (1.32) (0.40) (2.58) (0.57)     
1993 -0.780 0.410 0.245 -0.161 0.105 0.321 0.055 0.622 0.034 0.071 0.126 0.571  488 195.628 0.82 
 (3.71) (20.80) (14.78) (3.18) (1.68) (1.43) (0.29) (6.52) (0.62) (0.98) (2.06) (1.46)     
1994 -0.744 0.418 0.240 -0.184 0.082 -0.020 -0.299 0.618 0.049 0.060 0.134 0.563  461 177.365 0.81 
 (3.49) (21.28) (14.51) (3.83) (1.35) (0.09) (1.28) (6.02) (0.81) (0.80) (2.12) (1.04)     
1995 -0.772 0.405 0.244 -0.135 0.075 0.187 -0.581 0.655 0.085 -0.076 0.166 0.450  485 207.674 0.82 
 (3.77) (21.33) (15.26) (3.09) (1.31) (1.64) (3.03) (6.94) (1.62) (1.01) (2.59) (0.85)     
Pool -1.405 0.462 0.236 -0.112 0.087 0.200 -0.342 0.486 0.055 0.022 0.155 0.320 4638 1715.202 0.81
 (19.47) (68.85) (42.88) (6.95) (4.15) (2.86) (5.86) (14.28) (2.99) (0.87) (7.99) (3.60)     
Pool -1.405 0.462 0.235 -0.116 0.087 0.201 -0.341 0.486 0.055 0.021 0.158 0.441 -0.274 4638 1572.931 0.81 
 (19.47) (68.84) (42.82) (6.94) (4.15) (2.86) (5.85) (14.29) (3.02) (0.85) (8.11) (3.71) (1.53)    
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Brand = dummy variable, Big Six auditor = 1, 0 otherwise; 
DTA  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   Specialist =dummy variable, industry specialist =1, 0 otherwise;   
ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; B6Spec  = dummy variable, Big Six specialist =1, 0 otherwise.
  
Table 6 Panel B Multivariate audit fee regression models with AFSI ‘finer’ specialists  
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1985 -3.141 0.597 0.184 0.077 0.255 1.394 -0.589 0.190 -0.043 -0.102 0.125 -0.242 225 103.379 0.83
 (9.55) (19.68) (8.22) (0.79) (1.96) (2.33) (1.28) (1.41) (0.55) (1.27) (1.61) (0.99)     
1985 -3.103 0.593 0.186 0.082 0.242 1.406 -0.591 0.197 -0.048 -0.098 0.140 0.402 -0.809 225 95.311 0.82 
 (9.44) (19.47) (8.30) (0.85) (1.86) (2.36) (1.29) (1.46) (0.60) (1.22) (1.79) (0.76) (1.37)    
1986 -2.912 0.560 0.227 0.191 -0.094 0.253 0.081 0.368 0.035 0.037 0.142 -0.349  288 111.734 0.81 
 (9.14) (19.06) (10.13) (2.15) (0.93) (0.49) (0.18) (3.28) (0.45) (0.45) (1.91) (1.45)     
1986 -2.903 0.558 0.227 0.193 -0.096 0.244 0.078 0.371 0.034 0.039 0.149 0.014 -0.436 288 102.260 0.81 
 (9.09) (18.96) (10.12) (2.18) (0.95) (0.47) (0.18) (3.29) (0.43) (0.48) (1.98) (0.02) (0.68)    
1987 -2.328 0.510 0.239 0.002 0.108 0.301 0.030 0.348 0.002 0.129 0.215 -0.143  358 124.500 0.79 
 (7.74) (18.43) (11.37) (0.02) (1.12) (0.62) (0.06) (2.40) (0.00) (1.09) (3.04) (0.78)     
1987 -2.339 0.510 0.239 0.004 0.108 0.274 0.024 0.348 0.004 0.129 0.222 -0.046 -0.186 358 113.901 0.79 
 (7.75) (18.42) (11.33) (0.05) (1.12) (0.56) (0.04) (2.40) (0.05) (1.09) (3.08) (0.18) (0.52)    
1988 -2.540 0.545 0.237 -0.087 0.089 -0.144 0.967 0.376 0.040 -0.003 0.093 -0.120  430 163.614 0.81 
 (9.65) (23.41) (12.87) (1.28) (1.12) (0.39) (2.05) (2.98) (0.64) (0.03) (1.49) (0.78)     
1988 -2.541 0.545 0.237 -0.086 0.088 -0.144 0.957 0.377 0.040 -0.003 0.097 -0.088 -0.067 430 149.635 0.81 
 (9.64) (23.38) (12.85) (1.27) (1.11) (0.39) (2.02) (2.99) (0.64) (0.03) (1.51) (0.41) (0.22)    
1989 -2.468 0.552 0.211 -0.101 0.090 -0.408 0.540 0.343 0.086 0.159 0.112 -0.184  446 157.348 0.80 
 (9.09) (23.07) (11.25) (1.83) (1.23) (1.23) (1.32) (2.59) (1.37) (1.39) (1.76) (0.81)     
1990 -1.463 0.462 0.247 -0.109 0.078 0.197 0.187 0.328 0.071 0.050 0.120 0.244  473 175.360 0.81 
 (5.91) (20.79) (14.15) (2.44) (1.13) (0.73) (0.49) (2.85) (1.22) (0.44) (2.02) (0.75)     
1991 -0.899 0.421 0.254 -0.181 0.126 0.164 -0.465 0.454 0.129 0.001 0.142 0.068  496 188.122 0.81 
 (3.98) (20.55) (15.05) (3.64) (1.84) (0.72) (1.77) (4.16) (2.38) (0.01) (2.48) (0.25)     
1992 -0.679 0.398 0.254 -0.095 0.019 0.338 -0.318 0.552 0.073 -0.022 0.149 0.098  488 181.966 0.81 
 (3.23) (20.31) (14.85) (1.95) (0.35) (1.88) (4.14) (5.35) (1.33) (0.32) (2.52) (0.36)     
1993 -0.791 0.411 0.245 -0.158 0.102 0.299 0.060 0.632 0.037 0.081 0.112 0.222  488 194.879 0.82 
 (3.76) (20.85) (14.77) (3.12) (1.64) (1.33) (0.32) (6.63) (0.67) (1.11) (1.84) (0.81)     
1994 -0.734 0.417 0.239 -0.180 0.080 -0.026 -0.292 0.635 0.046 0.060 0.137 0.718  461 177.692 0.81 
 (3.44) (21.18) (14.42) (3.75) (1.31) (0.13) (1.25) (6.18) (0.82) (0.80) (2.16) (1.33)     
1995 -0.760 0.403 0.244 -0.133 0.074 0.184 -0.581 0.663 0.084 -0.076 0.173 0.297  485 207.773 0.82 
 (3.71) (21.12) (15.29) (3.04) (1.29) (1.62) (3.03) (7.03) (1.59) (1.02) (2.66) (0.95)     
Pool -1.333 0.456 0.239 -0.120 0.081 0.176 -0.330 0.506 0.061 0.032 0.147 -0.068 4638 1629.024 0.80
 (18.03) (66.29) (42.23) (7.05) (3.80) (2.50) (5.60) (14.45) (3.22) (1.21) (7.39) (2.99)     
Pool -1.334 0.456 0.239 -0.120 0.081 0.176 -0.330 0.507 0.061 0.032 0.148 -0.014 -0.078 4638 1493.030 0.80 
 (18.03) (66.27) (42.21) (7.04) (3.80) (2.50) (5.60) (14.50) (3.23) (1.21) (7.39) (0.11) (0.49)    
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Brand = dummy variable, Big Six auditor = 1, 0 otherwise; 
DTA  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   Specialist =dummy variable, industry specialist =1, 0 otherwise;   
ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; B6Spec  = dummy variable, Big Six specialist =1, 0 otherwise.
  
Table 6 Panel C Multivariate audit fee regression models for small clients (Assets <£35,329,000) with AFSI specialists 
 
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1985 0.258 0.276 0.377 -0.033 0.026 1.622 -1.082 0.379 -0.244 -0.440 0.023 0.066  44 7.306 0.61 
 (0.25) (2.24) (5.01) (0.18) (0.13) (0.77) (1.85) (1.29) (1.72) (2.51) (0.16) (0.41)     
1985 -0.322 0.324 0.409 0.055 0.033 -0.910 -1.478 0.668 -0.318 -0.542 0.251 0.814 -1.124 44 9.160 0.69 
 (0.34) (2.91) (6.01) (0.33) (0.19) (0.44) (2.74) (2.39) (2.47) (3.39) (1.70) (2.84) (3.02)    
1986 0.277 0.324 0.230 -0.318 0.184 1.430 -1.444 0.314 0.045 -0.121 0.034 0.281  60 4.853 0.42 
 (0.23) (2.59) (3.48) (1.37) (0.82) (1.14) (1.85) (0.96) (0.34) (0.73) (0.23) (2.03)     
1986 0.135 0.340 0.229 -0.370 0.226 -1.633 -1.513 0.345 0.055 -0.111 0.128 0.383 -0.201 60 4.438 0.41 
 (0.11) (2.66) (3.45) (1.51) (0.97) (1.26) (1.91) (1.04) (0.41) (0.66) (0.64) (1.88) (0.69)    
1987 -1.165 0.428 0.292 0.026 -0.046 -0.890 -1.264 0.284 -0.091 -0.024 0.173 0.075  85 7.339 0.45 
 (1.29) (4.61) (5.69) (0.18) (0.29) (0.89) (1.79) (1.26) (0.85) (0.18) (1.50) (0.68)     
1987 -1.116 0.424 0.291 0.020 -0.037 -0.900 -1.274 0.284 -0.091 -0.032 0.146 0.054 0.048 85 6.643 0.45 
 (1.19) (4.46) (5.59) (0.13) (0.23) (0.89) (1.79) (1.25) (0.84) (0.23) (0.83) (0.36) (0.20)    
1988 -1.589 0.459 0.286 -0.013 -0.028 -0.651 0.300 0.304 -0.020 0.128 0.082 0.006  106 8.402 0.44 
 (1.70) (4.98) (5.21) (0.07) (0.15) (0.78) (0.44) (1.59) (0.19) (1.04) (0.78) (0.06)     
1988 -1.559 0.458 0.284 -0.014 -0.026 -0.643 0.288 0.301 -0.022 0.124 0.063 -0.022 0.044 106 7.627 0.43 
 (1.64) (4.92) (5.10) (0.08) (0.14) (0.77) (0.42) (1.56) (0.21) (0.98) (0.46) (0.13) (0.21)    
1989 -1.502 0.477 0.243 -0.132 0.058 0.319 -0.246 0.197 0.091 -0.080 0.087 0.010  97 9.187 0.48 
 (1.43) (4.49) (4.55) (1.14) (0.41) (0.45) (0.51) (0.95) (0.84) (0.05) (0.85) (0.09)     
1989 -1.591 0.499 0.239 -0.141 0.081 0.379 -0.251 0.183 0.081 -0.019 0.032 -0.072 0.119 97 8.374 0.48 
 (1.49) (4.48) (4.40) (1.20) (0.54) (0.53) (0.52) (0.88) (0.73) (0.11) (0.22) (0.39) (0.53)    
1990 1.319 0.202 0.349 -0.174 -0.044 0.441 -0.668 0.258 -0.050 -0.050 0.015 0.016  118 14.985 0.57 
 (1.50) (2.39) (8.10) (1.46) (0.30) (0.77) (1.43) (1.56) (0.56) (0.40) (0.17) (0.19)     
1990 1.465 0.184 0.348 -0.172 -0.049 0.428 -0.700 0.279 -0.044 -0.055 0.082 0.141 -0.182 118 13.821 0.57 
 (1.65) (2.13) (8.07) (1.44) (0.33) (0.75) (1.50) (1.67) (0.49) (0.44) (0.75) (0.93) (1.00)    
1991 0.136 0.326 0.289 -0.221 0.170 0.688 -1.179 0.518 0.021 -0.032 -0.001 0.044  139 18.954 0.59 
 (0.21) (4.81) (7.24) (2.51) (1.59) (2.10) (3.72) (3.07) (0.27) (0.32) (0.02) (0.58)     
1991 0.108 0.333 0.289 -0.231 0.179 0.694 -1.179 0.507 0.014 -0.030 -0.042 -0.032 0.111 139 17.338 0.59 
 (0.16) (4.85) (7.24) (2.59) (1.66) (2.12) (3.72) (3.00) (0.18) (0.30) (0.42) (0.24) (0.68)    
1992 0.559 0.274 0.333 -0.144 0.000 0.534 -0.236 0.329 0.020 0.026 0.019 0.084  138 17.794 0.57 
 (0.87) (4.12) (8.14) (1.50) (0.00) (2.15) (3.34) (2.08) (0.25) (0.32) (0.24) (1.07)     
1992 0.560 0.273 0.333 -0.142 -0.001 0.533 -0.237 0.330 0.020 0.026 0.026 0.099 -0.020 138 16.185 0.57 
 (0.86) (4.08) (8.10) (1.46) (0.01) (2.13) (3.33) (2.07) (0.25) (0.31) (0.26) (0.67) (0.12)    
1993 -0.243 0.355 0.332 -0.156 0.041 0.672 0.096 0.303 -0.091 0.118 0.043 0.013  144 16.900 0.55 
 (0.37) (5.23) (7.96) (1.85) (0.42) (1.66) (0.53) (1.95) (1.14) (1.30) (0.52) (0.16)     
1993 -0.196 0.345 0.324 -0.141 0.035 0.714 0.077 0.328 -0.095 0.101 0.128 0.192 -0.255 144 15.798 0.55 
 (0.30) (5.08) (7.72) (1.66) (0.36) (1.77) (0.42) (2.10) (1.18) (1.08) (1.27) (1.31) (1.45)    
  
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq
Year Sign + + - + + - + + + + +     
1994 -0.005 0.356 0.242 -0.263 0.093 0.539 -0.236 0.626 -0.076 -0.036 0.127 0.178  112 19.104 0.64 
 (0.01) (5.67) (6.13) (2.84) (0.92) (1.25) (0.92) (3.10) (0.96) (0.40) (1.62) (2.18)     
1994 0.030 0.351 0.240 -0.266 0.101 0.573 -0.237 0.635 -0.070 -0.038 0.152 0.248 -0.097 112 17.408 0.64 
 (0.05) (5.48) (6.01) (2.85) (0.98) (1.31) (0.92) (3.12) (0.87) (0.41) (1.66) (1.59) (0.52)    
1995 -1.046 0.426 0.245 -0.065 -0.018 0.858 -0.499 0.534 0.030 -0.088 0.201 0.193  114 18.241 0.63 
 (1.50) (5.86) (5.51) (0.67) (0.16) (1.92) (2.22) (2.87) (0.37) (0.89) (2.25) (2.16)     
1995 -1.186 0.437 0.234 -0.077 0.004 0.916 -0.541 0.549 0.037 -0.107 0.272 0.367 -0.250 114 16.980 0.62 
 (1.69) (5.99) (5.19) (0.79) (0.03) (2.05) (2.39) (2.95) (0.45) (1.07) (2.61) (2.29) (1.31)    
Pool -0.335 0.359 0.293 -0.138 0.013 0.583 -0.355 0.345 -0.004 0.029 0.107 0.045  1113 125.006 0.55 
 (1.44) (14.92) (20.67) (4.05) (0.36) (4.11) (6.55) (5.97) (0.13) (0.90) (3.75) (1.62)     
Pool -0.337 0.357 0.293 -0.134 0.011 0.584 -0.355 0.351 -0.001 0.029 0.135 0.098 -0.080 1113 114.834 0.55 
 (1.45) (14.82) (20.66) (3.94) (0.31) (4.12) (6.56) (6.05) (0.04) (0.92) (3.84) (2.05) (1.37)    
 
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Brand = dummy variable, Big Six auditor = 1, 0 otherwise; 
DTA  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   Specialist =dummy variable, industry specialist =1, 0 otherwise;   
ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; B6Spec  = dummy variable, Big Six specialist =1, 0 otherwise.
  
Table 6 Panel D Multivariate audit fee regression models: estimation of the industry specialisation premium for AFSI non Big Six auditors 
over non Big Six non specialist auditors 
 
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Specialist N F R sq
 Predicted  + + - + + - + + + +    
1987 Specialist  -1.883 0.464 0.264 0.161 -0.026 0.192 0.053 0.143 -0.142 0.128 -0.203 120 36.378 0.75 
 Auditors (3.54) (9.68) (6.98) (1.24) (0.15) (0.26) (0.06) (0.56) (1.25) (0.75) (1.15)    
1988 Specialist  -2.061 0.519 0.226 -0.033 0.025 -0.152 0.220 0.174 -0.028 0.078 -0.058 133 48.797 0.78 
 Auditors (4.22) (11.95) (7.43) (0.30) (0.18) (0.26) (0.29) (0.79) (0.28) (0.48) (0.34)    
1989  Specialist -2.010 0.523 0.221 0.025 -0.088 -0.590 -0.393 0.299 -0.016 0.132 0.016 132 49.843 0.79 
 Auditors (4.07) (11.74) (7.25) (0.25) (0.71) (1.07) (0.53) (1.32) (0.16) (0.72) (0.11)    
1990 Specialist -1.095 0.426 0.263 -0.089 0.071 0.525 0.325 0.463 -0.085 0.053 -0.096 131 62.267 0.83 
 Auditors (2.37) (10.15) (9.03) (1.09) (0.58) (1.13) (0.43) (2.33) (0.93) (0.31) (0.67)    
1991 Specialist  -0.300 0.353 0.268 -0.130 0.124 1.026 -0.539 0.445 0.024 0.045 0.372 131 51.338 0.79 
 Auditors (0.64) (7.79) (8.27) (1.32) (0.95) (2.38) (1.31) (2.20) (0.25) (0.29) (1.72)    
1992 Specialist -0.122 0.344 0.278 -0.030 -0.067 0.526 -0.256 0.512 -0.062 0.079 0.059 117 41.582     0.78 
 Auditors  (0.27) (7.98) (7.79) (0.31) (0.61) (1.03) (3.34) (2.44) (0.62) (0.60) (0.41)    
1993 Specialist -1.015 0.419 0.221 -0.127 0.163 0.811 0.605 0.675 -0.016 0.209 0.158 110 50.849 0.82 
 Auditors  (2.27) (9.62) (6.44) (1.41) (1.34) (1.65) (1.99) (4.78) (0.17) (1.65) (1.11)    
1994 Specialist -1.302 0.465 0.219 -0.090 0.008 0.649 0.149 0.688 -0.105 0.136 0.223 96 37.686 0.79 
 Auditors  (2.73) (10.00) (5.50) (0.85) (0.06) (0.88) (0.40) (2.93) (0.90) (0.85) (1.23)    
1995 Specialist -1.230 0.443 0.238 0.002 0.011 0.637 0.148 0.408 -0.107 -0.110 0.199 90 49.716 0.85 
 Auditors  (2.73) (9.75) (6.23) (0.02) (0.07) (0.85) (0.42) (2.58) (0.99) (0.66) (1.14)    
Pool Specialist  -1.220 0.442 0.243 -0.044 0.042 0.484 -0.291 0.485 -0.066 0.092 0.044 1046 408.813 0.80 
 Auditors (7.87) (29.85) (22.08) (1.33) (0.99) (2.67) (4.34) (7.53) (1.94) (1.90) (0.84)    
 
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; 
DTA  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;    
Specialist = dummy variable, specialist non Big Six auditor = 1, non-specialist non Big Six auditor =0. 
 
  
Table 6 Panel E  
Audit fee regression model: estimation of the Big Six premium across sub-samples of client size (Total assets = £95,055,000)  
Intercep LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand N F R sq
 Predicted  + + - + + - + + + +    
1985 Large -1.025 0.387 0.246 0.025 0.174 0.673 -0.419 0.174 -0.023 -0.093 0.206 104 14.445 0.57 
 Clients (1.41) (5.22) (6.30) (0.20) (1.11) (0.71) (0.84) (0.84) (0.21) (0.78) (1.97)    
1986 Large -3.870 0.630 0.175 0.397 -0.167 0.213 0.328 0.006 0.217 -0.114 0.083 149 32.556 0.68 
 Clients  (5.77) (11.90) (5.59) (2.79) (0.98) (0.30) (0.55) (1.17) (1.81) (0.98) (0.72)    
1987 Large -3.311 0.575 0.240 -0.047 0.148 0.515 0.795 -0.004 0.136 0.090 0.299 183 30.755 0.62 
 Clients  (4.80) (10.71) (6.63) (0.36) (0.99) (0.75) (0.81) (0.74) (1.13) (0.39) (2.46)    
1988 Large -3.238 0.579 0.246 -0.202 0.266 0.504 2.929 -0.006 0.026 -0.491 0.212 204 35.787 0.63 
 Clients  (5.17) (12.42) (7.06) (1.79) (2.12) (0.86) (3.18) (1.04) (0.23) (2.01) (1.79)    
1989 Large  -3.640 0.629 0.219 -0.168 0.147 -0.872 2.877 -0.003 0.096 0.081 0.127 241 47.459 0.66 
 Clients  (6.53) (14.59) (6.72) (2.11) (1.47) (1.93) (3.39) (0.44) (0.96) (0.32) (1.20)    
1990 Large -2.330 0.523 0.248 0.120 0.145 0.032 1.234 -0.005 0.138 0.058 0.147 236 41.565 0.63 
 Clients  (4.18) (12.19) (7.16) (1.70) (1.30) (0.08) (1.67) (0.84) (1.36) (0.23) (1.38)    
1991 Large -1.388 0.459 0.248 -0.177 0.200 -0.104 0.114 -0.001 0.175 -0.011 0.208 237 39.609 0.62 
 Clients  (2.59) (11.05) (6.99) (2.31) (1.75) (0.29) (0.21) (0.18) (1.78) (0.06) (1.95)    
1992 Large -1.808 0.478 0.238 -0.086 0.202 0.049 0.236 0.001 0.169 0.046 0.217 233 42.075 0.65 
 Clients  (3.37) 11.38) (6.60) (1.16) (1.88) 0.14) (0.42) (0.22) (1.68) (0.28) (1.90)    
1993 Large -1.424 0.482 0.235 -0.181 0.229 -0.150 -0.362 0.002 0.119 0.045 -0.012 229 42.075 0.65 
 Clients  (2.67) (11.60) (6.31) (2.19) (2.23) (0.39) (0.60) (0.30) (1.13) (0.26) (0.10)    
1994 Large -1.523 0.474 0.269 -0.211 0.369 -0.699 -0.247 -0.004 0.179 0.172 -0.019 236 50.262 0.68 
 Clients  (3.00) (12.05) (8.12) (3.16) (3.60) (2.17) (0.37) (0.95) (1.86) (1.10) (0.16)    
1995 Large -1.750 0.475 0.241 -0.179 0.532 -0.428 -0.748 -0.000 0.218 0.095 0.118 251 62.400 0.71 
 Clients  (3.70) (13.18) (7.14) (2.94) (4.90) (1.85) (1.39) (0.04) (2.51) (0.68) (0.99)    
Pool Large -1.973 0.502 0.213 -0.111 0.160 -0.125 0.204 0.543 0.125 0.017 0.134 2145 428.171 0.67 
 Clients (11.71) (37.52) (28.29) (4.43) (4.43) (1.06) (1.07) (9.84) (3.85) (0.32) (3.79)    
1985 Small -4.671 0.708 0.159 0.290 0.235 1.547 -0.687 0.147 -0.097 -0.142 0.089 121 32.460 0.73 
 Clients (6.83) (13.47) (5.78) (1.87) (1.06) (2.09) (0.64) (0.85) (0.83) (1.31) (0.79)    
1986 Small -1.171 0.395 0.304 0.108 -0.081 -0.537 -0.207 0.029 -0.080 0.121 0.168 139 19.246 0.57 
 Clients  (1.70) (5.70) (6.35) (0.94) (0.64) (0.71) (0.44) (1.73) (0.83) (1.03) (1.74)    
1987 Small -1.095 0.397 0.256 0.054 0.074 0.234 -0.488 0.068 -0.093 0.082 0.154 175 28.545 0.61 
 Clients  (1.99) (7.11) (6.20) (0.58) (0.65) (0.37) (0.84) (3.99) (1.19) (0.66) (1.94)    
1988 Small -0.959 0.396 0.266 -0.015 0.023 1.061 0.270 0.055 -0.003 0.060 0.061 226 37.27 0.62 
 Clients  (2.00) (8.79) (8.28) (0.21) (0.25) (2.45) (0.59) (3.98) (0.05) (0.62) (0.99)    
1989 Small -1.151 0.430 0.221 -0.059 0.064 -0.163 -0.323 0.040 0.015 0.062 0.181 205 30.56 0.59 
 Clients  (2.19) (8.15) (6.32) (0.84) (0.67) (0.39) (0.81) (2.93) (0.21) (0.58) (2.72)    
1990 Small -0.473 0.374 0.283 -0.100 0.036 -0.036 -0.436 0.038 -0.019 0.006 0.118 237 47.158 0.66 
 Clients  (1.04) (8.60) (9.83) (1.92) (0.44) 90.09) (1.15) (3.47) (0.32) (0.06) (1.97)    
  
Intercep LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand N F R sq
 Predicted  + + - + + - + + + +    
1991 Small -0.037 0.337 0.295 -0.187 0.121 0.371 -0.720 0.030 0.085 -0.052 0.110 259 49.87 0.65 
 Clients  (0.09) (8.39) (10.72) (2.88) (1.47) (1.32) 92.76) (2.79) (1.47) (0.56) (1.85)    
1992 Small -0.009 0.336 0.292 -0.105 -0.006 0.309 -0.288 0.035 0.035 0.021 0.119 255 53.679 0.67 
 Clients  (0.02) (8.76) (10.39) (1.63) (0.09) (1.65) (4.56) (3.36) (0.63) (0.31) (2.02)    
1993 Small -0.409 0.377 0.278 -0.149 0.045 0.350 0.095 0.029 -0.005 0.076 0.155 259 46.997 0.64 
 Clients  (1.02) (9.66) (9.44) (2.29) (0.60) (1.07) 90.55) (2.83) (0.08) (1.04) (2.49)    
1994 Small -0.388 0.396 0.249 -0.172 -0.037 0.448 -0.439 0.026 -0.058 0.000 0.236 225 41.978 0.65 
 clients  (0.93) (9.86) (7.91) (2.29) (0.46) (1.75) (2.09) (2.15) (0.94) (0.01) (3.60)    
1995 Small -0.107 0.357 0.221 -0.094 -0.050 0.381 -0.569 0.062 -0.027 -0.103 0.197 234 50.651 0.68 
 clients  (0.26) (8.68) (7.49) (1.45) (0.70) (3.25) (3.19) (5.74) (0.46) (1.26) (2.93)    
Pool Small  -0.525 0.370 0.298 -0.102 0.011 0.380 -0.382 0.418 -0.001 0.037 0.169 2202 364.967 0.62 
 clients (3.62) (25.72) (32.71) (4.58) (0.43) (4.66) (7.26) (9.97) (0.07) (1.37) (7.94)    
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Brand = dummy variable, Big Six auditor = 1. 
DTA  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   Specialist =dummy variable, industry specialist =1;   
ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; 
  
Table 6 Panel F Table showing the aggregate audit, non-audit fees and market capitalisation for a sample of UK clients. 
 
 
 Industry  1985-95 Sample % clients  Market 1995 Annual Sample % clients  
Industry  Listing Number Audit fee NAS fee Quoting Capital Number Audit fee NAS fee Quoting 
Type 2 digit SIC of clients £’000 £’000 £0 NAS £M of clients £’000 £’000 £0 NAS 
 1 4 798 343 0 660.509 0 0 0 0 
Crop and livestock production 2 18 6081 3246 0 8775.118 3 1168 315 0 
Forestry, fishing and hunting  8 1 70 300 0 51.195 1 70 300 0 
Metal mining 10 4 3900 1160 25 5208.165 . . . . 
Coal mining, oil and gas extraction  13 69 14776 18277 23 36370.3 7 1355 1630 0 
Mining and quarry 14 23 21523 5961 30 14566.88 3 1732 794 0 
Building and construction 15 298 64484.14 28479 28 35230.88 32 6033 3161 3 
Heavy construction 16 27 5005 2346 15 2581.12 2 191 152 0 
Special trade  17 37 6313 16663 30 2375.994 4 923 4327 25 
Special trade construction 18 19 18128 1621 21 18443.67 2 2100 1326 0 
Food and kindred products 20 80 37484.33 22538.67 26 19678.3 6 2170 1098 0 
Tobacco products 21 196 119281 23975 29 153136 21 10102 2027 0 
Textile mill products 22 55 6827 2647 24 3149.06 6 539 189 0 
Apparel products 23 161 40418.4 110152 1 25042.55 19 4804 5574 0 
Lumber and wood products 24 40 3742 1987 35 1839.971 4 477 162 0 
Furniture and fixtures 25 49 5937 2140 35 2888.992 6 899 312 33 
Paper and allied products 26 22 8812 4545 0 9823.998 2 1669 413 0 
Printing and publishing 27 135 66509 34778 11 43429.84 16 9855 4723 0 
Chemicals and allied products 28 206 108813.5 88281.47 16 269679.6 25 16681 44703 12 
Pete refining and related industries 29 64 22278 20859 17 12400.96 7 2886 2705 0 
Leather and leather products 31 162 38618.69 41079.31 14 22879.91 19 5459 2897 0 
Stone, clay, glass, concrete products 32 47 34128.8 24821.2 2 14994.66 5 2910 2279 0 
Primary metal industries 33 120 60242 10934 15 36999.1 13 8203 1504 0 
Fabricated metal products 34 100 36383 11224 19 20054.47 10 3973 1953 0 
Industrial machinery 35 219 59049.25 96049.75 29 25773.62 17 5047 938 1 
Electrical equipment 36 324 107961.1 112609 21 68680.33 28 8414 7459 0 
Transportation equipment 37 214 113819.6 28460.41 29 63298.11 23 13033 4461 13 
Measurement instruments 38 119 36303.67 11252 24 31680.76 14 4601 2009 1 
Miscellaneous manufacturing  39 52 4963.69 7784 29 1653.092 5 411 1604 0 
Motor freight transportation 42 28 13806 541 43 11367.86 4 1738 0 100 
Water transportation 44 42 19865 14787 29 16333.95 3 124 132 0 
Air transportation 45 32 3626 1779 19 8104.221 2 374 135 0 
  
 Industry  1985-95 Sample % clients  Market 1995 Annual Sample % clients  
Industry  Listing Number Audit fee NAS fee Quoting Capital Number Audit fee NAS fee Quoting 
Type 2 digit SIC Of clients £’000 £’000 £0 NAS £’000 Of 
clients 
£’000 £’000 £0 NAS 
Transportation services 47 57 15880 4288 37 7714.665 5 1663 280 20 
Communications 48 69 32019.4 10369.6 33 315535.9 7 4145 1049 43 
Electric, gas, sanitary services 49 2 61 0 100 232.571 1 30 0 100 
Wholesale durable goods 50 143 61629.29 16357 1 35501.49 14 7981 5281 0 
Wholesale non-durable goods 51 212 74814.4 14122.13 33 51017.03 22 8146 3331 0 
Building materials 52 78 19566.67 7437 12 14802.61 7 2062 1218 14 
General merchandising stores 53 33 7790 4789 15 80518.18 3 858 815 0 
Food stores 54 82 12060.71 32411 13 114247 9 1642 3712 11 
Motor vehicle dealers, petrol station 55 64 10273 8180 0 4367.24 7 1015 957 0 
Apparel and accessory stores 56 92 20418.53 10806 28 25490.18 8 1871 1449 0 
Furniture and equipment stores 57 41 6236.75 7953 10 20425.18 3 1141 265 0 
Eating and drinking places 58 26 3975 408 15 4564.153 4 846 111 25 
Miscellaneous retail 59 38 16874 7351 3 43532.35 3 1732 275 0 
Hotels 70 61 11261 2691 49 10103.11 6 1567 284 33 
Personal services 72 55 8558 2762.793 31 3219.179 5 977 355.065 0 
Advertising, radio and TV services 73 82 32176.96 27443 5 6947.862 9 5279 7825 0 
IT, renting and leasing services 74 245 36221.35 22754.85 13 53747 29 3312 1906 <1 
Motor vehicle repair services 75 20 2057 1392 30 2283.776 2 247 630 0 
Miscellaneous repair services 76 17 1444 1142 1 888.088 2 225 36 0 
Motion pictures 78 13 5445 1714 8 10322.3 2 646 800 0 
Amusement and recreation services 79 46 5207.09 10052.91 13 5968.486 3 447 200 33 
Health services 80 29 24513.02 6439.54 14 16120.75 3 2446 2664 0 
Legal services 81 29 2393 1684 14 1020.181 3 217 149 0 
Educational services 82 12 1326 112 50 625.344 2 256 0 100 
Engineering and advisory services 87 115 22966.27 20540 18 6562.622 16 5101.67 1551 0 
Non classifiable establishment 100 9 625 300 0 51.189 1 70 300 0 
 
Special trade includes plumbing, heat and air conditioning, painting and paper hanging, electrical work, masonry, stonework, tiling, plastering and insulation work. Special trade 




Table 6 Panel G Multivariate audit fee regression models with AFSI non audit fee defined specialists  
 
Intercept LTA Sub Current Quick DTA ROI Foreign YE Loss Brand Specialist B6spec N F R sq
Year  + + - + + - + + + + +     
1991 -0.867 0.434 0.256 -0.187 0.122 -0.036 -0.462 0.428 0.175 -0.063 -0.006 -0.064  371 147.500 0.81 
 (2.87) (19.24) (13.35) (3.30) (1.54) (0.14) (1.36) (3.40) (2.77) (0.56) (0.04) (1.06)     
1992 -0.655 0.403 0.251 -0.115 0.059 0.258 -0.804 0.594 0.101 -0.142 0.119 -0.044  394 141.171 0.80 
 (2.48) (18.57) (13.18) (2.08) (0.91) (1.25) (2.62) (5.12) (1.60) (1.54) (0.99) (0.65)     
1993 -0.507 0.412 0.243 -0.171 0.102 0.205 -0.207 0.623 0.068 0.005 -0.107 -0.068  392 147.369 0.80 
 (1.89) (18.93) (12.93) (2.92) (1.44) (0.83) (0.88) (5.22) (1.05) (0.06) (0.80) (1.02)     
1994 -0.498 0.411 0.233 -0.196 0.094 -0.059 -0.600 0.613 0.078 0.013 0.008 0.085  386 143.224 0.80 
 (1.87) (19.33) (13.15) (3.71) (1.38) (0.28) (2.03) (5.49) (1.25) (0.16) (0.06) (1.29)     
1995 -0.536 0.389 0.244 -0.139 0.061 0.153 -0.839 0.762 0.132 -0.087 0.090 0.025  414 167.284 0.82 
 (2.00) (19.21) (14.26) (3.04) (1.00) (1.32) (3.84) (6.81) (2.28) (1.05) (0.64) (0.38)     
Pool -0.604 0.408 0.247 -0.161 0.090 0.131 -0.570 0.604 0.113 -0.053 0.023 -0.014  1956 750.380 0.81 
 (5.04) (42.99) (30.45) (6.80) (3.04) (1.62) (4.87) (11.76) (4.12) (1.37) (0.40) (0.51)     
 
LTA  = natural logarithm of total assets (£’000);   Foreign = proportion of subsidiaries that are foreign operations; 
Sub  = square root of the number of subsidiaries;   YE = dummy variable, fiscal year end between December and March inclusive = 1; 
Current   = ratio of current assets to current liabilities;  Loss = dummy variable, operating loss reported in prior 3 years;  
Quick  = ratio of current assets less stock to current liabilities; Brand = dummy variable, Big Six auditor = 1, 0 otherwise. 
DTA  = ratio of long-term debt to total assets;   Specialist =dummy variable, industry specialist =1, 0 otherwise;   
ROI  = ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; B6spec  = dummy variable, Big Six specialist =1, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
